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Note
Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption,
and State "Right to Sue" Legislation
in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila
James W Kim*

I. INTRODUCTION

A physician in Joliet contacted an insurance company in order to
obtain approval to admit a patient for treatment. An employee of the
insurer responded, "No, we won't go along with your suggestion, your
medical advice, send the patient home." The doctor in Joliet asked,
"Are you a doctor?"
He said, "No."
The doctor asked, "Are you a nurse?"
He said, "No."
The doctor asked, "Do you have a college degree?"
The man said, "Well, no."
The doctor asked, "Well, what is your training?"
He said, "Well, I have a high-school diploma, and I have the
1
insurance company manual that I'm reading from."
As insurance companies increasingly rely on administrative decisions
based on written policy rather than individual consideration, health
insurer liability for denials of necessary treatment is an area of law that
2
has seen considerable growth in litigation over the past thirty years. A
* J.D., Loyola University Chicago, expected May 2006. M.P.H., Columbia University, 2003.
I want to take this opportunity to thank my wife, Jae Hyun, for her tremendous patience and love
as well as my parents for their faith and support. Finally, I want to express my thanks to the
Loyola Law Journal staff for their assistance with composing and editing this Note.
1. 144 CONG. REC. S9733-36 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
2. See generally David L. Trueman, Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ERISA
Preemption?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 427 (2004) (detailing the history of federal and state

litigation regarding treatment denials and the evolution of various theories of liability in the
judicial system).
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Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") is a type of Managed Care
Organization ("MCO") that provides comprehensive health care to
voluntarily enrolled individuals and families with limited referral to
3
outside specialists financed by premium payments in advance.
Congress established MCOs through the Health Maintenance Act of
1973 in an attempt to curtail rising health care costs in the United
States. 4 MCOs, in part, provide discounted prices for health insurance
by utilizing cost-containment mechanisms that reduce the quanti and
availability of medical treatments to the beneficiary or participant.
At least 170 million Americans are currently enrolled in MCOs for
the purposes of health care insurance. 6 Every day, MCOs make
numerous administrative decisions such as the one described above that
routinely deny sick persons medically necessary treatments, which can
sometimes lead to serious injury. 7 Annually, a lack of necessary
medical care contributes to nearly 66.5 million avoidable sick days and
8
more than $1.8 billion in excess medical costs in the United States.
In 1974, Congress passed the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") with the primary focus of guaranteeing uniform
regulation of pension benefits to preserve the economic advantages of
large multi-state corporations. 9 ERISA, in part, created an exclusive
3. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at www.m-w.com (last visited March 8, 2005)
(defining an HMO as "an organization that provides comprehensive health care to voluntarily
enrolled individuals and families in a particular geographic area by member physicians with
limited referral to outside specialists and that is financed by fixed periodic payments determined
in advance").
4. See Michael Misocky, The Patients' Bill of Rights: Managed Care Under Siege, 15 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57, 57-58 (1998) (noting the development of MCOs as a means
of controlling "skyrocketing health care costs"); 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000) (defining the purpose of
the Act as a means to provide financial assistance to qualified HMOs in order to promote their
development to reduce healthcare costs). MCOs were established in an attempt to reduce costs by
taking advantage of pooling health risks into large groups, permitting easier predictability of need
and lower costs through bulk purchasing.
5. See Misocky, supra note 4, at 58 (illustrating the means with which an MCO controls costs
by reducing freedom of choice, freedom of speech, and freedom of association for physicians).
6. National Conference of State Legislatures, MANAGED CARE INSURER LIABILITY, available
at http://ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm (last updated Feb. 2005) [hereinafter NCSL Report].
7. National Committee for Quality Assurance, THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE QUALITY 2004:
INDUSTRY TRENDS AND ANALYSIS, available at http://www.ncqa.org/communications/SOMC/
SOHC2004.pdf (2004) [hereinafter NCQA Report].
8. Id.
9. H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646-47.
The enactment of progressive and effective pension legislation is also certain to
increase stability within the framework of our nation's economy, since the tremendous
resources and assets of the private pension plan system are an integral part of our
economy ....
[I]t is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans are
increasingly interstate. The uniformity of decision that [ERISA] is designed to foster
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remedy for certain wrongful denial of care claims in federal court,
effectively preempting any state claims against qualified health care

insurers.' This remedial scheme limited monetary recovery to the cost
of the wrongfully denied services and precluded punitive damages
against the insurer. 1
In an attempt to circumvent the restrictive nature of remedies under
ERISA, the Texas legislature passed the Texas Health Care Liability

Act ("THCLA") in 1997.12 THCLA made available a remedy for
negligent denial of care in state courts, allowing for compensatory as
well as punitive damage recovery. 13

Ruby Calad and Juan Davila

separately brought claims under THCLA against their HMOs in state
court, that removed the cases to federal court. 14

This Note will

Court decision
investigate the procedural history and eventual Supreme
15
cases.
Davila
and
Calad
consolidated
the
to
relating
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit's ruling, holding that both Calad and Davila's claims
for relief in state court under THCLA were preempted by section 502(a)
of ERISA. 16 This holding invalidated sections of THCLA related to
raising state claims for negligent denials of treatment by ERISAimpact for similar statutes passed in a
qualified HMOs and had a broad
17
states.
additional
of
number

Part II of this Note will begin with a discussion of ERISA, the
historical interpretation of ERISA preemption under section 502(a) and
will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed
actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws.
Id. at 4646-50.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
11. See id. (limiting recovery to equitable forms of recovery, including recovery for the cost of
treatment denied and injunctive relief).
12. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
13. Id.
14. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
15. The federal district courts in both cases refused to remand back to the state courts based
upon the preemptive power of ERISA. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated both
Calad's and Davila's claims with two similar claims brought under THCLA and reversed the
district courts' decisions concerning Calad's and Davila's claims. Id. at 306. The HMOs
appealed and were granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and raised the issue of
defining the preemptive scope of ERISA concerning wrongful denials of treatment by HMOs.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2492 (2004).
16. Id. at 2493.
17. See NCSL Report, supra note 6 (reviewing states that have passed "right to sue"
legislation that could have a potential negative impact from the Davila holding, including
Arizona, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia).
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section 514, and legislative responses at the state and federal level

through 2004.18 Part III will analyze the district court, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and United States Supreme Court
opinions concerning Ruby Calad and Juan Davila's cases leading up
through the Aetna Health v. Davila case. 19 Part IV will then argue that
the Supreme Court correctly interpreted the preemptive scope of ERISA

pertaining to wrongful denial claims. 20 Next, Part V will analyze the
impact of the Davila decision on subsequent ERISA claims, state

legislation outside of Texas, and potential congressional legislation
revising ERISA. 2 1 Finally, this Note will conclude by predicting that
Davila has shifted political pressures and will result in more expedient
congressional passage of ERISA revision through an effective federal
22
Patients' Bill of Rights, rendering Davila's holding obsolete.
II. BACKGROUND
ERISA is a comprehensive federal statute that regulates the creation
and administration of employee pension and benefits plans. 23 Since
employers traditionally provide health insurance as an important part of

retirement benefits, providers
of health insurance are potentially subject
24
to ERISA regulation.
A number of actions brought in state court against HMOs have been

preempted by federal law through sections 502(a) and 514 of ERISA.25
Federal courts characterize the scope of ERISA preemption related to

health insurance under sections 502(a) and 514 as a struggle between
18. See infra Part II (discussing the history, judicial interpretation, and state and federal
legislative responses to ERISA preemption); see also infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the codification of sections 502(a) and 514 of ERISA).
19. See infra Part III (reviewing the Davila case).
20. See infra Part IV (analyzing the unanimous and concurring opinions from Davila).
21. See infra Part V (examining the impact of the Davila case on individuals, states and the
federal government).
22. See infra Part VI (concluding that the net result of the Davila decision will be to catalyze
change to ERISA through congressional action).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-03 (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).
A civil action may be brought--(1) by a participant or beneficiary--(A) for the relief
provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
Id.
25. Kathleen J. McKee, Annotation, Liability of Third-Party Health-CarePayorfor Injury
Arising from Failureto Authorize Required Treatment, 56 A.L.R. 5th 737 (2004) (collecting and
discussing healthcare cases dealing with liability and ERISA preemption for negligent denial of
authorization to treat).
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policy and a desire to provide
the need for consistent national regulatory
2
substantive remedies for injured parties.
Accordingly, this Part begins by describing ERISA's statutory
structure and the legislative intent behind ERISA's enactment. 2 Next,
this Part discusses the historical interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
scope in the federal judiciary. 2 8 This Part concludes by examining
in various states, and prior attempts at ERISA
THCLA, its counterparts
9
reform in Congress.2
A. ERISA-Construction andDesign
ERISA's scope is extraordinarily wide and its construction complex;

the provisions of ERISA have been widely litigated in the judicial
system. 30 The Supreme Court has relied on its interpretation of
congressional intent and the plain language reading of the statute in its

rulings concerning ERISA preemption. 3 1 Therefore, a critical reading
of the statutory language of ERISA and its underlying legislative intent
is vital to gain32 a thorough understanding of its judicial interpretation

over the years.

1. ERISA's Statutory Structure and Remedial Mechanism
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to provide for comprehensive federal
regulation of employee benefits, including both pension plans and
welfare benefit plans such as health insurance. 3 3

These statutory

26. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (29 US.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) by United States Supreme Court, 150
A.L.R. FED. 441, § 2 (2004) (noting that "the Supreme Court cases interpreting the ERISA
preemption provisions reflect a tension between the goals of preempting state regulation of the
administration of employee benefit plans ... and traditional federal deference to state regulation
of insurance embodied in the insurance-savings clause").
27. See infra Part II.A (discussing ERISA's statutory construction and intentional design by
Congress).
28. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the judicial interpretation of ERISA's preemptive scope).
29. See infra Part II.C (detailing the various state and federal attempts at legislation to either
circumvent or amend ERISA prior to 2004).
30. See generally Campbell, supra note 26, § 3-5 (reviewing litigation in over fifty cases that
reached the Supreme Court concerning various provisions of ERISA and their judicial
interpretations).
31. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-46 (1987) (reviewing the intent behind
ERISA's enactment as a justification for the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's wide
preemptive scope).
32. See, e.g., Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move Towards
Defederalizing Claims for Patients'Rights,42 BRANDEIS L.J. 529, 541-43 (2004) (analyzing the
legislative intent of the drafters of § 502(a)(2) of ERISA compared to the interpretation of that
section by the Supreme Court).
33. Campbell, supra note 26, § 2.
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provisions regulate funding and vesting provisions for pension plans,
fiduciary responsibility of plan trustees, government pensions, plan
termination, multi-employer pension plans, and civil and criminal
penalties for violations of its provisions. 34 The provisions of ERISA
were enacted initially, in part, to address public concern that funds of
private pension plans were being mismanaged and abused.35
The primary rationale used by the courts justifying preemption of
state claims is the legislative intent behind ERISA.3 6 When enacting
ERISA, Congress intended to create a uniform national regulatory
scheme for employee benefits and pension plans. 37 As health insurance
is often made available through employer-provided benefits in the
United States, ERISA regulates the provision and administration of that
benefit. 38 ERISA's language indicates its function as a mechanism to

allow for multi-state organizations to more efficiently manage their
employee benefit plans by minimizing interference from state
legislatures. 39

mechanism,

In order to successfully create a uniform regulatory

ERISA requires

the implementation of a uniform

enforcement mechanism as well.4 °
The structure of ERISA delineates a remedial mechanism for

34. Id.
35. U.S. Department of Labor, History of EBSA and ERISA, at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/aboutebsalhistory.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (discussing benefit plans that affect interstate commerce
and the federal taxing power); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 45-46 (summarizing the congressional
intent behind ERISA as providing that "[i]f a state law 'relate[s] to... employee benefit plan[s],'
it is pre-empted" and concluding that the expansive express preemption provisions of ERISA are
designed to establish pension plan regulation as an exclusively federal issue); see generally infra
Part II.A.2 (describing in detail the legislative intent of Congress concerning ERISA's passage).
37. Schmall & Stephens, supra note 32, at 542.
The federal statute does not go about protecting plan participants and their
beneficiaries by requiring employers to provide any given set of minimum benefits, but
instead controls the administration of benefit plans, as by imposing reporting and
disclosure mandates, participation and vesting requirements, funding standards, and
fiduciary responsibilities for plan administrators.
Id.
38. See generally Campbell, supra note 26, § 2 (summarizing the content and scope of ERISA
regulation of health insurance providers).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (revealing the intent of Congress to protect the "revenue
of the United States" through the creation of minimum standards for uniform treatment of
employee benefit plans through enactment of ERISA); Schmall & Stephens, supra note 32, at 542
(explaining the intent of the drafters of ERISA concerning protection of pension funds without
specific concern for medical care).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (describing the policybehind the enactment of ERISA and
describing the need for protections to be afforded participating beneficiaries of ERISA-regulated
plans).
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qualified denials of health benefits. 4 1 Section 502(a)(3), codified in 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a), specifically applies to civil enforcement for potential
wrongful denials of claims by beneficiaries of ERISA-regulated plans.4 2

This remedial plan, founded on principles of equity, limits recovery of
damages for wrongful denial of treatment claims to the cost of benefit
denied.43 Alternatively, under this section injunctive relief is made

available to claimants, as well as a description of future eligibility prior
to an actual denial of benefits. 4 4 Section 514 of ERISA, codified in 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), establishes a defense against laws enacted by state
45
legislatures that regulate ERISA plans.
Although the intent behind ERISA was to create a uniform regulatory
mechanism that superseded state law, Congress created a narrow
exception in deference to the traditional regulation of insurers by the
states. 4 6 The "savings clause" of section 514 provides that state laws in
the general regulation of insurance, banking, or securities are not
subject to preemption, permitting states to preserve some regulatory
power over certain ERISA-regulated organizations. 4 7 Nevertheless, the
"deemer clause" of section 514 limits the scope of the savings clause by
creating an exception for self-insured health plans, putting them outside
the scope of state regulation of insurance companies.4 8 This nuance of
the ERISA scheme permits traditionally state-regulated industries to be
subject to general state supervision, while limiting certain benefit plans
that meet the self-insured exception to regulation by federal statute
49
alone.
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000) (reciting the various means of civil enforcement for
infractions made by ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans in federal courts).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000) (stating that "[a] civil action may be brought.., to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan").
43. Id.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.").
46. See Trueman, supra note 2, at 433-35 (describing the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the "savings clause" of ERISA).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that "nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities.").
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) (stating that "an employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) ... shall be deemed to be an insurance company ... for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies").
49. Trueman, supra note 2, at 433-34 (detailing the scope of section 514 of ERISA and its
application to organizations that meet the terms of the "deemer clause" exception).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

The Supreme Court has interpreted nearly all state-based claims

against HMOs that supplant or enhance the civil remedial scheme of
ERISA as being completely preempted by section 502(a).5 ° Under the
doctrine of complete preemption, section 502(a) of ERISA precludes
state jurisdiction over wrongful denial of treatment claims even if the
body of the original complaint does not contain a controlling federal
question issue.
Section 514(a) of ERISA, in contrast, has been
interpreted as an example of conflict preemption based on the language

of the statute. 52 Under the conflict preemption doctrine, section 514(a)
is regarded as preempting claims that "relate to" the determination of
benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by ERISA.53
50. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "complete preemption" as
"[t]he rule that a federal statute's preemptive force may be so extraordinary and all-encompassing
that it converts an ordinary state-common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded-complaint rule"); see also id. at 303 (defining the "well-pleaded
complaint rule" as requiring the body of the complaint to state a "controlling issue of federal law"
in order for federal-question jurisdiction to exist).
A number of actions originally brought in state court have been pre-empted by federal
law, specifically by sections of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001, et seq. ERISA is a comprehensive federal statute which
regulates the creation and administration of employee pension and benefits plans. It
contains a pre-emption clause which provides that ERISA supersedes any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.
McKee, supra note 25, § 2a. See Ronald F. Hoffman & Mark 0. Hiepler, An Easy Out for
Managed Care, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1998, at A19 (describing the preemptive scope of ERISA as
denying state-law remedies for HMO misconduct). See generally FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498
U.S. 52, 70-71 (1990) (holding a state law prohibiting subrogation of health plans to a plan
member's tort recovery was preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA). The doctrine of preemption
has its basis in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which permits federal
statutes to supersede state legislation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
51. Trueman, supra note 2, at 429 ("'Complete preemption' is an exception to the 'wellpleaded complaint rule.' ...
If complete preemption is implicated, a defendant converts a
plaintiff's state law claim into a federal question merely by utilizing the defense." (quoting Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987))).
52. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 518 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the "doctrine of conflict
preemption" as "[t]he principle that federal or state law can supersede or supplant state or local
law that stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of the overriding
federal or state law").
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." (emphasis
added)); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,45 (1987) (summarizing the scope of section
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659

Although this distinction is subtle, the preemptory power of section
502(a) is therefore greater in scope than section 514, and more likely to
be used as a basis for preemption of state-law based claims, 54while
by the insurer.
section 514 will be more often utilized as a defense
2. Legislative Intent Underlying ERISA's Enactment
Prior to 1974, plaintiffs claiming recovery for treatment denials from
employee benefit plans relied upon state contract and trust law to
55
recover benefits in the judicial system. This approach had substantial
procedural and jurisdictional hurdles to overcome in order to allow
injured beneficiaries to recover.5 6 Realizing the inadequacy of this
system, Congress decided to provide a federal system that would permit
in federal court and
beneficiaries to recover for wrongful benefit
5 7 denials

provide a uniform standard of regulation.

On January 3, 1973, Representative John H. Dent from Pennsylvania

introduced House Resolution Two, the Employee Benefit Security Act,
58
This proposal
during the Ninety-Third Session of Congress.
eventually led to the passage of Public Law 93-406 on September 2,

1974, in the form of ERISA, which repealed the Welfare and Pension

Plans Disclosure Act. 5 9

Initially, Congress primarily intended to

regulate the pension plans of multi-state employers for the benefit of
their participants.

A large portion of these benefits entailed health

514(a) of ERISA as preempting state law claims relating to employee benefit plans ).
54. See Trueman, supra note 2, at 434 (contrasting the effect of sections 502(a) and 514's
preemptive scope and applicability).
55. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 955-56 (stating that before ERISA's enactment,
participants had to use state contract and trust law to recover denied benefits from private
employee plans); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643
(describing the system of regulation prior to ERISA's passage by stating that "[i]n the absence of
adequate federal standards, the participant is left to rely on the traditional equitable remedies of
the common law of trusts").
56. See Flint, supra note 55, at 956-58 (discussing such jurisdictional obstacles for recovery
of benefit denials prior to ERISA's enactment such as rules requiring service on all trustees).
57. Id.
58. H.R. 2, 93rd Cong. (1973), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
59. Id. ("Repeals the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act except that such Act shall
continue to apply to any conduct and events which occurred before the effective date of this
Act"). The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was passed in 1958 to reduce welfare and
pension plan abuses by requiring the administrators of all such plans to furnish participants and
beneficiaries with a written description and annual financial status report for each plan. Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
The Employee Benefit Security Act as reported by the Committee is designed to
remedy certain defects in the private retirement system which limit the effectiveness of
the system in providing retirement income security. The primary purpose of the bill is
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insurance coverage; therefore, Congress also brought health benefit

plans under the umbrella of ERISA jurisdiction.6 1 Over the years, the
vast increase in health insurance coverage through employment-based
insurance has defined ERISA as a primary means of regulation for
health benefits for millions of Americans. 62
Congress enacted 29 U.S.C. § 1001 as part of the statutory scheme of
ERISA to protect the various pension and retirement plans of multi-state
corporations through a uniform series of regulations that superceded
state-level regulations. 63

Congress considered the establishment of

ERISA preemption as an essential element of that regulatory scheme in
order to

4prevent

inconsistent

state-level

regulation

of pension

programs.
As an integral part of the regulation of benefit
determinations, the House sponsors of the bill explicitly noted the civil
remedial mechanism as exclusively available under federal law, not to
be circumvented by other state-imposed liability.65 These remedial
the protection of individual pension rights.... In broad outline, the bill is designed to:
(1) establish equitable standards of plan administration;
(2) mandate minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan
benefits;
(3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the amortization
of unfunded liabilities;
(4) insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature plan
termination; and
(5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the number
of participants receiving private retirement benefits.
Id.

61. Michael B. Snyder, Benefits Guide § 3:28.5 (2004) (stating that "[i]t is clear that the
original drafters of this extremely broad body of law intended to cover mainly retirement benefits,
even though the definition of "plan" certainly covers health care (and other welfare) plans").
62. NCSL Report, supranote 6.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643 ("The
proposed bill would, therefore, establish minimum standards of vesting, funding, and fiduciary
and a system of compulsory benefit insurance to protect the security of pension rights."). See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (delineating the general purpose behind ERISA's enactment as
to protect pension and retirement plans of employees from non-uniform state regulation).
64. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162 ("[T]he
provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee benefit plan that is
established by an employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee
organization that represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.").
65. See id.
at 5188. The civil remedies in section 502(a) allow:
[I]ndividual participants and beneficiaries will also be able to bring suit in Federal
court in such instances, as well as to obtain redress of fiduciary violations. In addition,
participants and beneficiaries may bring suit to recover benefits denied contrary to the
terms of their plan, and where such claims by participants or beneficiaries do not
involve application of the substantive requirements of this legislation, they may be
brought in either State or Federal courts of competent jurisdiction. It is intended that
such actions will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar

2005]

Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila

mechanisms were created in order to protect the general welfare of the
people and to prevent from abuses; nevertheless, their application has
deviated from this original goal.6 6
B. JudicialInterpretationof ERISA Preemption

Over the past thirty years, federal judiciary interpretation of ERISA

Although courts broadly interpreted
preemption has evolved.6 7
in sections 502 and 514 in cases
expressed
scope
ERISA's preemptive

prior to the year 2000, this has been subject to substantial debate within
the judiciary in recent years. 68 Accordingly, this Section will review
ERISA interpretation in the federal courts and state responses to the
litigation leading up to Davila.
1. Preemption Cases Prior to 2000
Prior to 2000, federal courts generally interpreted ERISA as having
broad preemptory power that precluded a wide variety of claims from
being raised in state court. 6 9 The Supreme Court's ruling in a pair of
cases-Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell and Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux-set a precedent for broad preemption

fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Id.; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987) (describing the preemptive scope
of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act as having "pre-emptive force ... so
powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law .. ");
McKee, supra note 25, § 2a (stating that ERISA's preemptive scope extends so far as to preempt
claims that leave no comparable federal remedy under the regulatory scheme of ERISA).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
[T]hat owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning
their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and
to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and
administration of such plans.
Id.
67. See generally Campbell, supra note 26, § 2 (considering the construction and application
of ERISA's preemptive scope in United States Supreme Court cases since ERISA's passage in
1974).
68. See id. (detailing an overview of the history of Supreme Court cases dealing with
interpretations of ERISA's preemptive scope relating to state claims for treatment denials).
69. See, e.g., Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that ERISA does not provide damages remedy for a wrongful denial of treatment); Kuhl v.
Lincoln Nat'l. Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling that a
state-based claim against an insurer for delaying a surgery under a welfare benefit plan was
preempted by ERISA); see McKee, supra note 25, § 6 (reviewing a series of cases decided prior
to 2000 by the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits that upheld broad preemptory power of ERISA
concerning a failure to authorize treatment by ERISA-qualified health benefit plans).
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that the federal judiciary followed until Pegram v. Herdrich in 2000.70

The Supreme Court has interpreted section 502(a) as providing an
exclusive remedy for wrongful denial of treatment claims in 7federal
1

The
court, with particularly broad application in early interpretations.
Massachusetts
was
scope
first interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, a case concerning the untimely
72 The Court
processing of a health care plan beneficiary's claims.
considered the issue of whether a plan participant could recover
punitive or extracontractual compensatory damages under section 409

of ERISA. 73 After analyzing the legislative intent and amendments

made to ERISA prior to its passage in light of section 502(a)'s

comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court concluded that section 409
74
did not provide for extracontractual damages. Nevertheless, the Court

specifically left open a small window of opportunity, restricting its
decision to section 409(a) and not considering the possibility of
75
extracontractual damages under section 502(a).

70. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41 (1987); see Trueman, supra note 2, at 430 (describing the foundational complete
preemption cases of Pilot Life and Russell as being followed by federal courts that "routinely
ruled that claims alleging wrongful denials of care are attacks on the mechanism by which
benefits are administered and should be preempted and dismissed as attempts to improperly
obtain a remedy"); infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Pegram v. Herdrich case). In Pegram, the
Supreme Court ruled on a claim for wrongful denial of treatment relating to the actions of an
HMO employee in the dual role of treating physician as well as administrative agent. Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000). The Court held that determinations involving the mixture of
treatment and eligibility decisions made by the administrative employee were outside of the scope
of ERISA and therefore subject to liability in state courts. Id. at 237 ("We hold that mixed
eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA.").
71. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (holding that ERISA section 502(a)'s civil remedial scheme
was clearly intended for all suits alleging improper processing of claims).
72. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.
73. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000) (detailing section 409 of ERISA). The language of 29
U.S.C. § 1109(a) details section 409 of ERISA as providing that:
(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal
of such fiduciary.
Id.
74. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. See generally Misocky, supra note 4, at 97-98 (noting that
persons injured by their managed care companies' decisions concerning medical treatment are in
many cases limited to the dollar value of the benefit denied).
75. Mass Life, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5 ("Because respondent relies entirely on § 409(a), and
expressly disclaims reliance on §502(a)(3), we have no occasion to consider whether any other
provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extracontractual damages."); id.at 145-46 ("It is true
that an early version of the statute contained a provision for 'legal or equitable' relief that was
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Following its decision in Massachusetts Life, the Supreme Court
reinforced and expanded its determination of ERISA's preemptive
scope in several key cases. 76 First, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.

Dedeaux, the Court considered claims for denial of disability benefits to
77
an ERISA-regulated plan beneficiary.

The Court affirmed the

granting of summary judgment in favor of the insurer, declaring that the

doctrine of complete preemption invoked by ERISA preempted state
law claims. 7 8 The Supreme Court stated that section 514(a) of ERISA
79
employee benefit plan.
expressly preempts a claim that "relates to" an
Furthermore, the Court also emphasized the broad complete preemptive

power of section 502(a), particularly looking to policy-based rationale
8°
for exclusive civil enforcement of benefit denials through ERISA.
The Court emphasized the necessity of a uniform system of
enforcement in order to guarantee equitable treatment of multi-state
81 Finally, the Court
insurers and to permit their efficient function.
expanded the rule of law from Massachusetts Life, concluding that
extracontractual damages could not be awarded for any ERISA-based

expressly
claim, stating that Congress only authorized those damages
502(a)(3).
section
of
mechanism
remedial
civil
the
stated within
Following the precedent set forth in the Pilot Life and Massachusetts
Life cases, the Supreme Court continued to uphold the wide-ranging
described in both the Senate and House Committee Reports as authorizing 'the full range of legal
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts."' (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-533
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871)). But that language appeared in Committee
Reports describing a version of the bill before the debate on the floor and before the SenateHouse Conference Committee had finalized the operative language. Id. In the bill passed by the
House of Representatives, and ultimately adopted by the Conference Conmmittee, the reference to
legal relief was deleted. Id.
76. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. 41, 44-46 (citing Congressional intent as justifying
ERISA's wide preemptive scope).
77. Id. at 43.
78. Id.at 56 ("[T]he civil enforcement scheme of ERISA makes clear its intention that all suits
brought by beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISAregulated plans be treated as federal questions governed by § 502(a).").
79. Id. at 47.
80. Id.at 56.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 56
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
'The six carefully integrated civil enforcement
Congress rejected in ERISA.
the statute as finally enacted ...provide strong
of
§
502(a)
provisions found in
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot
to incorporate expressly.'
Id. (quoting Mass. Milt. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
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preemptive power of ERISA.8 3 In 1987, the Court decided the case of
MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. v. Taylor.84 In Metropolitan Life, the

Court considered a wrongful termination of disability benefits by an
ERISA-regulated employer. 85 In most circumstances, a claim can only
be subject to preemption if it follows the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule. 86 Nevertheless, the Court held that the "well-pleaded complaint"

rule did not apply to cases of ERISA preemption because of ERISA's

extraordinary preemptive power, preempting claims where the
complaint brought by the plaintiff only raised state law causes of
87
action.

Consistent with the broad interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
scope evidenced in prior rulings by the United States Supreme Court,
the Fifth Circuit in Corcoran v. United Healthcare held that a state-

based tort claim for wrongful denial of hospitalization by an ERISA-

regulated health plan was preempted by ERISA.8 8 The court considered
the language of the statute, noting that there was an explicit provision
stating that ERISA's remedial mechanism would supersede any and all
state laws affecting ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans.8 9 The
Fifth Circuit determined that the boundary of ERISA's preemptive
scope extended to regulate medical or benefit decisions made by the

utilization reviewer in denying authorization for hospitalization. 90 In

this case, the court determined that the utilization reviewer made a
medical decision related to the determination of benefits and therefore
83. See generally Trueman, supra note 2, at 430-35 (reviewing the broad preemptive
scope of
ERISA in the federal judiciary prior to 2000 following the Pilot Life and Russell cases).
84. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
85. Id at 60-61.
86. Id. at 63-67 (defining the extraordinary preemptive power of ERISA section
502(a) as
similar to that of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and therefore
not
subject to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule).
87. Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 67 ("Accordingly, this suit, though it purports to raise
only state
law claims, is necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly manifested
intent of
Congress."). It, therefore, arise[s] under the laws of the United States, and is removable
to
federal court by the defendants. Id. (internal citations omitted). See infra note 50 (defining
the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule).
88. Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992).
89. Id at 1328 ("In performing this analysis we begin with any statutory language
that
expresses an intent to pre-empt, but we look also to the purpose and structure of the
statute as a
whole").
90. Id. at 1332 ("The principle of Pilot Life that ERISA pre-empts state-law claims
alleging
improper handling of benefit claims is broad enough to cover the cause of action asserted
here");
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
ed. 2000),
availableat http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary (defining "utilization review"
as "[a]
process for monitoring the use and delivery of services, especially one used by a
managed care
provider to control health care costs").
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held that ERISA preempted the state claim.

91

Corroborating this view in another jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit in
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. also interpreted ERISA's

preemptive scope broadly. 92 The court held that vicarious liability
claims against an ERISA-regulated benefits provider for the negligent
actions of a treating physician were not preempted by section 502
complete preemption but were preempted by the conflict preemption

doctrine of section 514(a) because the claims "related to" an employee
benefits plan. 93 In addition, the court found that a claim of negligent
denial of benefits brought against an employee nurse of the insurer, who
had the responsibility to make treatment decisions concerning benefits,
94
The Jass court
was completely preempted under section 502(a).
applied a three-part analysis of characteristics that considered: (1)
whether the claim could have been brought under ERISA; (2) whether

the claim concerned a denial of benefits; and (3) whether5 the claim

9
could be resolved without interpreting the benefits contract. The court
ultimately found that, under this analysis, the claim brought against the
to
nurse met each of these characteristics and was therefore subject
9
under state law.
resolution
from
it
barring
preemption,
complete

Following the same logic applied in Jass, the Eighth Circuit in Kuhl
91. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331 ("Ultimately, we conclude that United makes medical
decisions-indeed, United gives medical advice-but it does so in the context of making a
determination about the availability of benefits under the plan.").
92. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We
conclude that Jass' [sic] state law negligence claim against Margulis and her vicarious liability
claim against PruCare for Margulis' [sic] alleged negligence are within the scope of § 502(a) of
ERISA and therefore completely preempted.").
93. Id. at 1488 ("A claim brought against a plan administrator for vicarious liability of an
actual or apparent agent, while subject to 'conflict preemption' under § 514(a) is not subject to
the jurisdictional doctrine of 'complete preemption' under § 502(a)").
94. Id. at 1495. "Dismissal of the vicarious liability claims against PruCare for Dr.
Anderson's alleged negligence was also appropriate because these claims 'relate to' the benefit
plan and as such are preempted by § 514." Id. The Jass court interpreted 'related to' as defined
by their plain language. Id. at 1493. "The structure and legislative history indicate that the words
'relate to' are intended to apply in their broadest sense." Id. (quoting Central States v.
Neurobehavioral Ass'n., 53 F.3d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1995)).
95. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1489.
96. Id.
The Rice factors all support the conclusion that Jass' [sic] claim against Margulis is
really a § 502(a) denial of benefits claim. First, as a plan participant Jass was entitled
to bring suit under § 502(a). In fact, the record contains an earlier complaint that Jass
filed arising out of the same events .... Second, Jass' [sic] claim against Margulis is
Third, Jass' [sic] negligence claim against
in effect a claim for denial of benefits ....
Margulis cannot be resolved without interpreting the benefits contract because that
contract provided the benefits to which Jass was entitled.
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v. Lincoln NationalHealth Plan ofKansas City, Inc. held that an insurer

who refused to pre-certify a surgical treatment in a timely manner was

taking part in the administration of benefits. 97 The court held that the

claim primarily relied on Kuhl's status as a beneficiary of the health
insurance plan and was therefore preempted by ERISA. 98 The Seventh

Circuit interpreted the congressional intent of ERISA section 514(a) as
preempting all state laws related to any employee benefit plan. 99 The
court held that even a state law that only has an incidental effect on
ERISA would be preempted by its broad preemptive scope. l0 0 The

court also affirmed its holding from a prior case, ruling that claims for
monetary damages under section 502(a) of ERISA were not appropriate,
because money damages were a legal remedy, unlike the equitable

remedies provided for in ERISA.''

The Supreme Court again

confirmed the exclusion of extracontractual damages in Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, where the Court held that the provision for

"appropriate equitable relief' in ERISA section 502(a) precluded
relief
10 2
in the form of punitive damages.
In Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA preempted a state-law
based cause of action against the administrator of an employee-health
benefit plan who approved and later denied authorization for

treatment. 10 3 The court reviewed the actions of the administrator who
authorized a procedure, withdrew authorization, and then ultimately
authorized the procedure two days after the patient brought suit to
97.

Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
98. Id.
99. Id.
Moreover, ERISA's preemption clause is not limited to laws which relate to the
specific provisions of ERISA. A state law may "relate to" an employee benefit plan,
and therefore be preempted, even though the state law was not designed to affect
benefit plans and its effect on such plans is only incidental.
Id.
100. Id.("The key to determining whether a state law is preempted is whether the state law in
question 'relates to' an ERISA plan.").
101. Id.at304.
After an extensive review of the history of equitable remedies and the statutory
language of section 502(a)(3), the Court concluded that damages do not constitute
'other equitable relief.' . . . The district court properly held that the Kuhls'
[sic] claim
for monetary damages was not cognizable under section 502(a)(3)(B)(i).
Id. (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993)).
102. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260 ("We cannot agree, however, that § 502(1) establishes the
existence of a damages remedy under § 502(a)(5)--i.e., that it is otherwise so inexplicable that
we must give the term 'equitable relief the expansive meaning 'all relief available for breach of
trust."').
103. Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993).
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compel authorization. 104 The Ninth Circuit characterized these actions
as "related to" the administration and disbursement of ERISA-plan
in spite of the
benefits, placing it within the scope of ERISA preemption
1 5
0
scheme.
ERISA
the
within
remedies
lack of available
2. Prior Consideration of Preemption of State Law
Since federal courts generally held cases filed in state court for
treatment denials to be preempted by ERISA, states responded by
enacting statutory mechanisms with the intent of circumventing
ERISA's limited recovery scheme. 106 Prior to 2004, the Supreme Court
heard several cases concerning ERISA preemption and the superseding
of state-law attempts to provide regulation outside the scope of
ERISA. 10 7 This precedent helped to define the boundaries of ERISA's
regulatory scheme and the scope of the "savings clause" exception to
ERISA regulation.l°8
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., the Court considered a New York law that
imposed a surcharge on commercial insurers for hospital bills that
9
exempted Blue Cross/Blue Shield from the surcharge. 0 The Court
rejected a pure textual interpretation of the preemptive scope of ERISA
in favor of an equitable construction, noting that the broad textual
interpretation of the "relates to" clause would preempt nearly any
insurance regulation.1 10 Relying on the Congressional intent behind
104. Id.
105. Id. at 131-32; see McKee, supra note 25, § 6 (detailing the holding of the Ninth Circuit
in the Spain case as upholding the doctrine of complete preemption as applied to ERISA).
106. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Construction and Application of State
PatientBill of Rights Statutes, 87 A.L.R. 5th 277 (2000) (considering federal court interpretations
of various attempts by states to expressly provide for state claims for treatment denials).
107. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (reviewing an
Illinois statute requiring HMOs to provide independent review of disputes between primary-care
physicians and HMOs for potential ERISA preemption).
108. See generally Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause: Progress Towards a More
Equitable Preemption of State Laws, 34 IND. L. REv. 207, 212 (2001) (detailing the various
holdings of federal courts reviewing potential superseding of state-law regulations affecting
HMOs for ERISA preemption).
109. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 649 (1995). See Pittman, supra note 108, at 214-17 (detailing the Court's holding in
Travelers).
110. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 655.
The governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive. Section 514(a) marks for preemption 'all state laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan' covered
by ERISA, and one might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the words
of limitation ('insofar as they.., relate') do much limiting.
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ERISA's preemptive power, the Court noted that the New York state

regulation only acted as an indirect economic influence on health
insurers and did not directly contradict the purpose of ERISA as a
means of uniform enforcement."' l Based on this interpretation of the
statute, the Court held that the imposition of a surcharge on hospital

bills was a general regulation of insurance
within the "savings clause"
12

of ERISA and therefore not preempted.'
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, the Supreme Court

reviewed a Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act a provision of
that required HMOs to provide binding independent review of disputes
between a treating physician and the HMO. 113 Analyzing the details of
the Illinois statute, the Court found that it embodied a state regulatory

scheme that provided no new cause of action under state law and did not
enlarge any claims beyond the benefits already made available in

section 502(a). 1 14 The Court held that this state regulation fell within
the "savings clause" of ERISA, did not conflict with ERISA by
supplementing or supplanting its civil enforcement scheme, and thus
115
was not subject to preemption.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of preemption of state law in
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller.116 Kentucky had

enacted an "any willing provider" statute that required health insurers to
include all health care providers that agreed to meet their payment terms
within their networks.' 17 The Court held that this statute was a general
regulation of insurance as it affected the risk pooling arrangement
111. Id. at 659-60 ("An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself;
commercial insurers and HMO's may still offer more attractive packages than the Blues.").
112. Id at 668.
We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic
effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state
law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514. But as we have shown, New York's
surcharges do not fall into either category; they affect only indirectly the relative prices
of insurance policies, a result no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally
subject to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to
eliminate.
Id.
113. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002).
114. Id. at 386-87 ("[T]he independent reviewer's de novo examination of the benefit claim
mirrors the general or default rule we have ourselves recognized; and its effect is no greater than
that of mandated-benefit regulation."). See Miller, supra note 106, § 51 (reviewing the holding in
Rush Prudentialconcerning preemption under ERISA).
115. Rush Prudential,536 U.S. at 387.
116. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 331-32 (2003).
117. Id.
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between the insurers and its beneficiaries. 118 Affirming its prior
decision in Rush Prudential,the Court ruled that since the "any willing

provider" statutes such as the one challenged in Kentucky were general
laws regulating insurance, they fell within the "savings clause" of
ERISA, and were not subject to preemption.119
3. Pegram v. Herdrich:A Turning Point for ERISA Jurisprudence?

Prior to 2000, the federal courts had uniformly interpreted ERISA as
broadly preempting all claims for wrongful denial of treatment that
were "related to" the administration of a benefit plan. 120 The Supreme
wide-ranging preemptive
Court took the opportunity to revise this
12 1
Herdrich.
v.
Pegram
of
case
power in the
In Pegram, the Court considered the issue of whether treatment

decisions made by physician employees of an ERISA-regulated HMO
are fiduciary acts and therefore preempted by ERISA. 122

Dr. Lori

Pegram, an employee of the HMO providing benefits, examined
Cynthia Herdrich, the beneficiary, who had been suffering from
abdominal pain. 123 Dr. Pegram determined that Herdrich would have to
wait for eight days in order to receive an ultrasound exam. 124 Prior to
the expiration of the eight day waiting period, Herdrich suffered from a
ruptured appendix, resulting in peritonitis. 12 5 Herdrich sued Dr. Pegram
118. Id. at 338 ("We have never held that state laws must alter or control the actual terms of
insurance policies to be deemed 'laws ... which regulat[e] insurance' under § 1144(b)(2)(A); it
suffices that they substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured.").
119. Id.
Kentucky law provides that "[a] health insurer shall not discriminate against any
provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the health benefit plan
and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the
health insurer, including the Kentucky state Medicaid program and Medicaid
partnerships."
Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Banks-Baldwin 2001)). See also David L.
Bacon, US. Supreme Court Holds ERISA Does Not Preempt "Any Willing Provider" Laws, 3
BENDER'S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 5 (2003), available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com (last visited
Jan. 16, 2005) (reviewing the Supreme Court's ruling in the Miller case). "Any Willing
Provider" laws are laws that require all providers that wish to take part in an HMO's plan terms
must be permitted to join the network of providers. Id.
120. See generally Trueman, supra note 2, at 430-35 (detailing the history of federal
interpretation of ERISA preemption prior to 2000).
121. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (limiting the preemptive scope of ERISA
as not applicable to certain cases of HMO-employed physicians making "mixed decisions of
eligibility and treatment").
122. Id. at214.
123. Id. at 215. See generally Trueman, supra note 2, at 435-36 (reviewing the facts of the
Pegram case).
124. Pegram,530 U.S. at 215.
125. Id. See MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.m-w.com
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and Carle, the HMO, for medical malpractice in state court, which the

defendants promptly removed to federal court, arguing ERISA
26

preemption.1

In its opinion, the Supreme Court first differentiated prior decisions
127
based on "treatment" relative to decisions concerning "eligibility."'
Next, the Court noted that many decisions fell into the category of
"mixed eligibility and treatment decisions," and that the alleged actions
by Dr. Pegram fell into this category as a treating physician and
administrator acting on behalf of the HMO. 128 The Court ruled mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions made by HMO-employed physicians
were not fiduciary decisions and therefore were not regulated by the
civil remedial scheme of ERISA. 129

The Court held that a mixed

eligibility and treatment decision was outside the fiduciary relationship
because of the physician-patient relationship between the treating

physician and the claimant. 130 Accordingly, the Court held that
Herdrich's claims were not subject to removal to federal court under
ERISA, and her state-based claim of malpractice was permitted to
13 1
proceed outside of the ERISA enforcement scheme.

(last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (defining peritonitis as an inflammation of the peritoneum, which is a
membrane that lines the cavity of the abdomen).
126. Pegram,530 U.S. at 215-16.
127. Id.at 228.
What we will call pure 'eligibility decisions' turn on the plan's coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for its treatment. 'Treatment decisions', by contrast,
are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient's condition: given
a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response?
Id.
128. Id.at 229-30.
The kinds of decisions mentioned in Herdrich's ERISA count and claimed to be
fiduciary in character are just such mixed eligibility and treatment decisions:
physicians' conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests; about seeking consultations
and making referrals to physicians and facilities other than Carle's; about proper
standards of care, the experimental character of a proposed course of treatment, the
reasonableness of a certain treatment, and the emergency character of a medical
condition.
1d.
129. Id.at 237.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 237 (reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
preemption and removal of Herdrich's original claims in state court to federal court under
ERISA); Campbell, supra note 26, at § 8.5 (describing the holding of the Supreme Court in
Pegram as ruling that "[m]ixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by health maintenance
organization (HMO), acting through its physician employees, were not fiduciary acts within
meaning of ERISA and, thus, could not form basis for breach of fiduciary duty claim under
ERISA").
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4. Interpretation of Pegram in the Federal Courts
Leading Up to Aetna Health

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram, a series of
controversial decisions in the federal judiciary and commentary from
legal scholars interpreted the practical result of the Pegram holding on
ERISA's preemptive scope both broadly and narrowly. 132 Narrowly
interpreting the holding in Pegram, commentators argued that Pegram

only permitted state claims to be brought in cases where an employee
physician of an HMO was making a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision concerning denial of benefits. 133 Broader interpretations of
Pegram contended that any mixed eligibility and treatment decision
permitted circumvention of
concerning denial of
34 medical treatment

ERISA preemption.1

In 2003, the Second Circuit was the first appellate court to apply the

Pegram exception to sections 502(a) and 514 preemption in Cicio v.
Vytra Healthcare,holding that claims against an HMO and its physician
directors for wrongful denial of treatment were not preempted as135a
decision involving mixed eligibility and treatment considerations.
The court reasoned that the precedent set in Pegram was a contraction
of the preemptive scope of ERISA generally and that Pegram stood for

the principle that any mixed decisions of eligibility and treatment were
outside the scope of ERISA.1 36
The Eleventh Circuit adopted this interpretation in Land v. CIGNA
Healthcare of Florida,ruling on a case concerning negligent denial of

hospitalization by an HMO-employed nurse for an infection in a
The court held that the nurse's
patient's hand and finger. 13 7
' 138
determination involved a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision.
132. See Trueman, supra note 2, at 438-39 (arguing for a broad interpretation of the Pegram
exception to ERISA preemption); Dionne Koller Fine, PhysicianLiability and Managed Care: A
Philosophical Perspective, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 663 (2003) (describing the changing
environment of managed care and arguing for a more restrictive view of treating physician
liability concerning mixed decisions of eligibility and treatment).
133. See generally J. Keith Pollette, ERISA Preemption of "Mixed Eligibility and Treatment
Decisions" by HMOs, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 393, 420-21 (2003) (describing the more narrow
interpretation of Pegramas applied in the circuit courts following Davila).
134. See Trueman, supra note 2, at 438-39 (arguing for a broader interpretation of Pegram
that holds administrative agents of HMOs liable in state courts for "mixed decisions of treatment
and eligibility" as well as treating physician-employees of the HMO).
135. Cicio v. Does, 312 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003); Trueman, supra note 2, at 446.
136. Cicio, 312 F.3dat 99.
137. Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d 1286, 1288 (1lth Cir. 2003), rev'd 381 F.3d
1274 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
138. Id. at 1292.
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Relying on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Pegram,
the circuit court held that the actions of the nurse-administrator
employed by the 139HMO were outside of the scope of ERISA's
preemptive power.
In contrast, the Third Circuit read Pegram more narrowly in the case
of Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc., in which the court responded to
a claim of delayed approval of medically necessary surgery by the

HMO's administrators that allegedly caused injury to the plan
participant. 140 The court agreed with a narrow interpretation of
Pegram, stating that the Supreme Court implied that ERISA section
141
502(a) did not preempt all mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.
The court stated that for the purposes of complete preemption analysis
the critical issue was whether the claim challenged an eligibility
determination for benefits or the quality of medical treatment
performed. 142 The court specifically stated that claims alleging a denial
of benefits made by an HMO based on a lack of coverage decision
would

fall

underneath ..the

former

category

as

an

eligibility

determination for benefits and therefore be completely preempted by
ERISA. Conversely, a claim challenging the quality14 3of medical
treatment would be outside of ERISA's preemptive scope.

Applying its holding in Pryzbowski, the Third Circuit again ruled in
favor of a more narrow interpretation of the Pegram exception to
preemption in DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare.

The DeFelice

139. Id. at 1293.
140. Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 2001) ("She asserts six
counts against U.S. Healthcare, which allege that U.S. Healthcare 'negligently and carelessly
delayed in giving its approval for the necessary surgery which the plaintiff... urgently needed,'
causing Pryzbowski severe and permanent injury, emotional distress, and future expenses for
medical care and treatment").
141. Id.at279.
Moreover, there is a strong suggestion in Pegram that claims based on medical
treatment decisions remain outside the preemptive effect of ERISA. In holding that
mixed eligibility/treatment decisions made by an HMO are not encompassed by the
fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA, the Court made clear its view that ERISA was not
designed to allow plan participants 'to bring malpractice actions in the guise of federal
fiduciary breach claims against HMOs.'
Id. (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,236 (2000)).
142. Id.at 273.
143. Id.
[A] claim alleging that an HMO declined to approve certain requested medical services
or treatment on the ground that they were not covered under the plan would manifestly
be one regarding the proper administration of benefits. Such a claim, no matter how
couched, is completely preempted and removable on that basis.
Id.

144. DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 346 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2003). See generally
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opinion set out a two-part analysis, where courts must first examine the
claim for wrongful denial of treatment to fit wholly within the category
145
of a pure treatment decision or an entirely administrative decision.

For those claims which do not fit within these two extremes, the
complaint is scrutinized to reveal whether a claim could have
alternatively been brought under section 502(a) of ERISA.146 Based on
this analysis, the claim is preempted147if the state-based claim could have

been brought under ERISA instead.

C. State and FederalLegislative Responses to ERISA Preemption

Following the Pegram decision, and in response to growing pressure
from the public, Congress and several states considered passage of
Patients' Bill of Rights statutes. 148

These statutes, in some cases,

expressly provided the right to sue an HMO for wrongful or negligent
denials of medically necessary treatment. 149 This section will begin by
introducing and analyzing the Texas Health Care Liability Act of 1997,
legislation, and conclude by
proceed to consideration of other state
150

discussing federal changes to ERISA.

1. The Texas Health Care Liability Act
In 1997, the Texas Legislature passed THCLA. 15 1 Texas was the
first state to pass a statute that granted health plan beneficiaries the

ability to sue their HMO. 152 THCLA was a Patients' Bill of Rights Act
passed by Texas in response to growing public demand for such
Pollette, supra note 133, at 416-17 (detailing the holding in the DeFelice case and describing the
Eleventh Circuit's reading of Pegram).
145. DeFelice, 346 F.3d at 448 ("Pryzbowski thus instructs us to determine whether a claim is
preempted under section 502(a) by first examining whether the claim falls at either of the two
poles, entirely treatment or entirely administrative.").
146. Id.
In the more difficult situation in which the claim falls somewhere in between, we must
scrutinize the complaint for 'artful pleading,' and then refer to section 502(a) itself and
determine whether the actual alleged wrongdoing underlying the cause of action could
have formed the basis of a suit under that section.
Id.
147. Id.
148. See generally Miller, supra note 106, Part II (reviewing the passage and interpretation of
Patients' Bill of Rights statutes following the Pegram case).
149. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (detailing
the specific right to sue HMOs granted to health plan beneficiaries).
150. See infra Part II.C.1-3 (discussing the impact of THCLA, other state "right to sue"
statutes, and ERISA amendments).
151. S.B. 386, 75th Leg. (Tex. 1997), availableat www.harp.org/sb386.htm.
152. See NCSL Report, supra note 6 (detailing THCLA and its provision for a private "right
to sue" in case of a wrongful denial of benefits).
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legislation.' 53 THCLA guaranteed certain rights in relation to health
care plan beneficiaries and participants,
and applied to ERISA-regulated
54
plans as well as non-ERISA plans. 1
THCLA section 88.022(a) contains a specific provision that is aimed
at circumvention of ERISA preemption. 155 This section provides a
state-based claim for damages proximately caused by negligence on the
part of the managed care company. 156 This statute permits a claim to be

brought in state court for the negligent denial of authorization for
treatment that has the potential to recover both compensatory and
punitive damages. 157 The availability of punitive and compensatory
damages is the main attraction for plaintiffs to sue under THCLA or a
similar state law, as opposed to the equitable relief available under

ERISA section 502(a). 158 In addition to its provision of a state-based
claim for recovery of damages for negligent practice by the insurer,
THCLA also permits independent medical review of the benefit
159
determination to be requested by the HMO.

153. See generally American Benefits Council, PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS: MYTHS AND
REALITIES, available at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/issues/health/myths-reality.htm
(describing a Patients' Bill of Rights Act as a statute outlining patient protections that includes
the right to sue the health care plan administrator for failure to provide necessary treatments).
Public support for a Patients' Bill of Rights reached a peak in 1997, when President Clinton urged
Congress to enact such a bill in his State of the Union Address.
154. See generally TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004)
(detailing the specific rights granted to health plan beneficiaries within the state of Texas under
THCLA).
155. Id. at § 88.002(a).
A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care
entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health
care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee
proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care.
Id.
156. See id. at § 88.002 (imposing liability upon managed care companies for damages
proximately caused by negligent activity defined as a failure to exercise "ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions"). Ordinary care is defined as "that degree of care a
health insurance carrier ... of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar
circumstances." Id. at § 88.001(10) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
157. Michael B. Snyder, Health Maintenance Organizations, BENEFITS GUIDE § 3:28.5
(2004).
158. See generally Geri Aston, Texas Trial: HMO Liability Law, AM. MED. NEWS, May 28,
2001, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/05/28/gvsaO528.htm (last visited
Jan. 16, 2005) (describing THCLA "right to sue" provisions and the additional remedies as
compared to ERISA).
159. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
The insured or enrollee or the insured's or enrollee's representative must submit the
claim to a review by an independent review organization if the health insurance carrier,
health maintenance organization, or managed care entity against whom the claim is
made requests the review not later than the 14th day after the date notice under
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Since its enactment in 1997 through May 2001, an estimated fifteen
160
During
to twenty-five lawsuits have been brought under THCLA.
this same period the state received 1,234 requests for independent

of which has been
reviews under THCLA, the quick turnaround
16 1
to trial.
attributed to the lack of lawsuits going

2. Other State Legislation Circumventing ERISA
Since 1997, other state legislatures have enacted statutes similar to
THCLA. 162 In the years leading up to 2004, substantial support among
163 Georgia was the
the public helped to push legislation in this realm.

second state to authorize such a law with the enactment of H.732 in
1999.164

California quickly followed suit, passing SB21 in 1999, which

took effect in 200 1.165 Washington State enacted its own "right to sue"
Subsection (a)(2)(A) is received by the health insurance carrier, health maintenance
organization, or managed care entity.

Id.
160. Aston, supra note 158 (estimating the number of lawsuits since the enactment of the
THCLA).
161. Id.
162. William Branigin, High Court Sides with HMOs on Malpractice Suits: Unanimous
POST (June 21, 2004),
Ruling in Texas Cases Strikes at Heartof Patients' Rights Debate, WASH.
4

available at http://www.washigtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57585-200 Jun2l .html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2005) ("Besides Texas, nine other states have laws that allow patients to sue their health
maintenance organizations in state courts. They are Arizona, California, Georgia, Maine, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington and West Virginia.").
163. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT: THE PUBLIC, MANAGED
CARE, AND CONSUMER (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/archive
_aug2004/index.cfm ("From 1998 through 2001, when a comprehensive Patients' Bill of Rights
was being debated in Congress, large majorities of the public said they were in favor of such
legislation.") [hereinafter KFF Report]. During the Patients' Bill of Rights debate, in 2001,
"seven in ten (69%) said that it would be very or somewhat important to them that patients' rights
legislation includes the right to sue a health plan." Id.'vlore recently, in August 2004, 57% said
they would favor a new law giving people the right to sue." Id.
164. GA. CODE ANN., § 51-1-48 (1999) (stating that "any injury or death to an enrollee
resulting from a want of such ordinary diligence shall be a tort for which a recovery may be had
against the managed care entity offering such plan, but no recovery shall be had for punitive
damages for such tort."). See generally H.B. 732, available at http://www.ganet.org/cgibin/pub/leg/legdocbillname=1999/HB732&docpart-full (detailing the full text of the Bill as
passed by the Georgia legislature in 1999). Texas' "right to sue" statute is considered in the
Aetna Health v. Davila case by the Supreme Court and is the primary focus of this Note.
165. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West Supp. 2005).
For services rendered on or after January 1, 2001, a health care service plan or
managed care entity, as described in subdivision (f) of Section 1345 of the Health and
Safety Code, shall have a duty of ordinary care to arrange for the provision of
medically necessary health care service to its subscribers and enrollees, where the
health care service is a benefit provided under the plan, and shall be liable for any and
all harm legally caused by its failure to exercise that ordinary care ....
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regulation in March 2000, scheduled to take effect in July 2001.166
Arizona, Maine, and Oklahoma passed similar HMO liability laws in
April 2000.167 In 2001, the states of West Virginia, New Jersey, and
North Carolina also enacted comparable regulations. 168
Oregon,
Louisiana, Missouri, and New Mexico enacted additional laws that
impose limited liability on health insurance companies when certain
conditions are met. 16 9 In total, nine states outside of Texas authorized
166. S.B. 6199, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000), available at http://www.leg.us.gov/
pub/billinfo/1999-00/senate/6175-6199/6199_s2_slO3l52000.txt. ("[H]ealth carrier is also
liable for damages under (a) of this subsection for harm to an enrollee proximately caused by
health care treatment decisions that result from a failure to follow the accepted standard of care
made by its: (i) Employees; (ii) Agents").
167. H.B. 2600, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2000), available at http://www.azleg.
state.az.us/legtextl44leg/2r/summary/h.hb2600-4-06-00-astransmittedtogovemor.doc.htm
(establishing the right to sue a health care insurer for damages caused to an enrollee by the
insurer's delay in authorizing or failure to authorize a request for a covered service that is
medically necessary or by the insurer's denial of payment of benefits covered under the health
care plan if the health care insurer acted in bad faith), H.P. 543, 119th Leg., 2d Regular Session
(Me. 2000); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 24-A, § 4313(l)(a) (West Supp. 2004).
[C]arrier has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions that affect the quality of the diagnosis, care or treatment provided to an
enrollee and is liable for damages as provided in this section for harm to an enrollee
proximately caused by the failure of the carrier or its agents to exercise such ordinary
care
Id.; S.B. 1206, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2000), available at http://www.lsb.state
.ok.us/1999-OOSB/SB 1206_int.rtf ("A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization,
or other managed care entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions and shall be liable for damages for harm to an enrollee").
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.51(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("(a) Each managed care entity for a
health benefit plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care decisions and
is liable for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by its failure to
exercise ordinary care"); W. VA. CODE § 3-25c-7(a).
After settlement or exhaustion of all legal appeals involving determinations of whether
health care services are medically necessary or experimental, a managed care plan
must comply with the decision rendered in an external review under this article and
may be held civilly liable for all damages proximately caused to an enrollee for its
failure to so comply
Id.; S.B. 1333, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2000/Bills/AL1O1/187 .htm.
Under the provisions of this section, a carrier or organized delivery system shall be
liable for the health care treatment decisions of its employees, agents or other
representatives over whom the carrier or organized delivery system has the right to
exercise influence or control, or has actually exercised influence or control.
Id.
169. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22.3085(D).
A covered person or his representatives, heirs, assigns, or health care providers shall
have a cause of action for benefits or damages against an MNRO, health insurance
issuer, health benefit plan, or independent review organization for any action involving
or resulting from a decision made pursuant to this Chapter if the determination or
opinion was rendered in bad faith or involved negligence, gross negligence, or
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general "right to sue" legislation and four states passed more limited
liability statutes through June 2004.170
Analogous to the terms of THCLA, these state liability acts provided
punitive and compensatory damages recovery for violations brought in
state court.1 7 1 Claimants who contended they were wrongfully denied
necessary medical treatment actively utilized these statutes leading up to
medical review process deciding
the Davila decision, with California's 172
operation.
of
614 cases in its first year
3. Federal Legislative ERISA Reform
To address the changing needs of the United States regarding the
regulation of benefits provision, Congress made three major
amendments to ERISA in 1996 and has considered several other
where
proposed amendments. 173 The amendments addressed situationscare.
174
health
mental
require
or
families change jobs, have children,
Congress enacted the first of these amendments, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), in order to protect those
people who encounter difficulties in obtaining health-care coverage
175 HIPAA has far-ranging and wide
when they change employers.
application to privacy and security issues concerning provision of health
benefits, but does not contain any provision to revise the remedies
176
Congress also
available for wrongful denial of benefits claims.
enacted the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act
intentional misrepresentation of factual information about the covered person's
medical condition.
Id.
If an insurer has agreed under the provisions of a health benefit plan to be bound by the
decision of an independent review organization and the insurer fails to comply with
such a decision, the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services
shall impose on the insurer a civil penalty of not less than $100,000 and not more than
$1 million.
H.B. 3040, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001).
170. See id. (stating that the number of states passing legislation that permitted beneficiaries to
sue their managed care companies in state court equal to "ten states as of the date of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in June 2004").
171. See id. (summarizing the liability terms for each of the state "right to sue" statutes as
being similar to that imposed by THCLA or a more limited form).
172. Snyder, supra note 157, § 3:28.5.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)-(g) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2000).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)-(g) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2000).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)-(g) (2000).
176. See generally Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
MEDICAL PRIVACY-NATIONAL STANDARDS TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF PERSONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (describing in detail the security,
privacy and code set transactions requirements of HIPAA).
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("NMHPA") in 1996.117 NMHPA forbids group health plans, HMOs,
and insurance companies from mandating the discharge of a mother and
newborn sooner than forty-eight hours after a normal vaginal delivery
or ninety-six hours after a cesarean section birth. 17 8 Finally, Congress
enacted the Mental Health Parity Act ("MHPA") in 1996, requiring that
annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health benefits of employee
health plans cannot be less than those dollar amounts provided for
medical and surgical benefits. 17 9 None of these amendments have any
relevance to the denial of benefits made by HMOs and do nothing to
80
revise the civil remedial scheme of ERISA. 1
Although ERISA amendments in prior years have not led to
substantial change related to its preemptive scope, Congress
unsuccessfully attempted to create new remedies for wrongful denials of
treatment by developing federal common law within the judiciary. 18 1
Congress also considered several proposals that attempted to revise the
regulatory system of ERISA to exempt health insurers, which were also
met with failure. 18 2 In a proposal made in Congress in 1989, ERISA
would have been amended to preserve state law remedies only against
insurance companies. 183 The second proposal involved establishing
federal procedures and judicial remedies for improper handling of
claims only with respect to welfare plans. 184 In 1993, the Clinton
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2000 & West Supp. 2004).
178. Id.
179. 29U.S.C. §1185(a).
180. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HIPAA INSURANCE REFORM: THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY
ACT, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaal/content/mhpa.asp (last modified Sept.
17, 2004) (describing the passage and impact of the Mental Health Parity Act on ERISA plan
participants).
181. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989), 55-56, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 1948 (detailing the Budget Committee recommendation on the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989). The Committee felt that the legislative history of ERISA
clearly indicated that Congress intended courts, through federal common law, to develop
"appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically enumerated in section 502 of ERISA,"
for
improper claims processing. Id. The Committee reaffirmed the authority of the Federal courts to
shape legal and equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before them,
even though those remedies may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA, by drawing upon
principles enunciated in state law, including such remedies as the awarding of punitive and/or
compensatory damages against the person responsible for the failure to pay claims in a timely
manner. Id.
182. See generally George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the FederalCommon Law for
Plan Interpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 964-65 (1995) (reviewing the various proposals
in Congress made to exempt certain areas of insurance provision from ERISA's general
regulatory scheme).
183. S. 794, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991); H.R. REP. No. 1602, 102nd Cong. (1st Sess. 1991).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 1881, 103rd Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) (proposing the Health Insurance
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administration proposed a third change that involved removing health
care plans from ERISA and establishing a new system of procedures,
administrative hearings, and judicial review for the sole purpose of
185 Congressman
regulation within the limited sphere of healthcare.
Charles W. Norwood also proposed an amendment to ERISA, the
Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997 ("PARCA"), which
permitted subscribers to hold health plans legally accountable for
malpractice. 186 In 1998, the House passed the Republican-sponsored
Patient Protection Act, which did not provide for a right to hold an
87
Of the above-mentioned
188
MCO responsible for negligent care.
successfully enacted.
was
Act
proposals, only the Patient Protection
Nevertheless, the passage of the Patient Protection Act failed to provide
an adequate means of recovery for plan participants who were
not
it did 189
wrongfully denied necessary treatment by their HMO, asscheme.
remedial
ERISA
the
beyond
provide an express right to sue
III. DISCUSSION
In Aetna Health v. Davila, the United States Supreme Court clarified
the scope of the preemptive power of section 502(a) of ERISA by
narrowing the applicability of the Pegram exception to ERISA
The Supreme Court consolidated two cases that
regulation. 190
challenged the removal of claims based on a denial of care in violation
of THCLA. 19 1 The primary issue in these cases was whether an HM4O
administrative body denying medical care based upon mixed
determinations of eligibility and treatment was acting as a fiduciary and
Claims Fairness Act of 1993 that permitted recovery of punitive damages against certain parties
in cases of fraud).
185. H.R. REP. No. 3600, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) (detailing the 1993 Clinton
Administration proposal for the Health Security Act that would have established civil penalties
for wrongful denial or delay of claims).
186. H.R. REP. No. 1415, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997).
IN
187. See generally MICHELE M. GARVIN, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS,
1996)
eds.,
Brewbaker
W.
&
Hall
(M.
CARE
MANAGED
LAW:
HEALTH CARE CORPORATE
(detailing the provisions of the Patient Protection Act of 1998 and noting its failure to include a
"right to sue" section).
188. H.R. REP. No. 4250, 105th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov/.
189. Id.
190. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004) ("Here, however,
petitioners are neither respondents' treating physicians nor the employers of respondents' treating
physicians."). Petitioners' coverage decisions, then, are pure eligibility decisions, and Pegram is
not implicated. Id.
191. Id. at 2492-93. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (detailing the specific rights granted to health plan beneficiaries within the state of
Texas under THCLA).
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therefore subject to ERISA preemption under section 502(a).' 92
Ruby Calad and Juan Davila filed cases in state court claiming
wrongful denial of treatment in violation of the standard of care
required by THCLA. 19 3 Both Calad and Davila based their claims on
THCLA instead of pursuing an ERISA claim because of the availability
of recovery for compensatory and punitive damages under the state
regulation. 94 Cigna Healthcare of Texas ("Cigna") and Aetna Health
Inc. ("Aetna"), the defendant HMOs, removed the cases to federal court

based on ERISA preemption. 195 The district courts refused Ms. Calad's

motion to remand to state court and dismissed Mr. Davila's case with

prejudice after he refused to file an ERISA claim. 196 The Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals consolidated the Calad and Davila cases on appeal

with two additional cases concerning section 502(a) preemption. 197 A
panel of the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's
decisions with respect to Ms. Calad and Mr. Davila's claims, holding
that these mixed
scope of ERISA
and Davila, the
decision that the
of ERISA and

preemption. 199

eligibility and treatment decisions were outside of the
preemption. 198 After certiorari was granted in Calad
United States Supreme Court held in a unanimous
claims were completely preempted by section 502(a)
that sections of THCLA were invalidated by this

A. Facts
Ruby Calad was a beneficiary of an ERISA-regulated employee

health benefit plan administered by Cigna. 200 Cigna was responsible for
192. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2492.
193. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth circuit consolidated
Ruby Calad, Juan Davila, Walter Thorn, and Gwen Roark's claims into a single appeal. Id.
194. See supra Part II.C. 1 (analyzing the availability of additional recovery under THCLA of
compensatory and punitive damages, in contrast to the recovery of the treatment denied under
ERISA). Had Calad and Davila raised ERISA claims, they would have been limited to
recovering the cost of a Vioxx prescription or additional hospital stay. This would have been
economically impractical, considering the cost of litigation alone would have far exceeded any
potential recovery under ERISA.
195. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302-03.
196. Id.at 302.
197. Id. at 302-03. Walter Thorn and Gwen Roark also presented challenges to ERISA's
preemptive scope relating to wrongful denials of treatment. Id.
198. Id. at 311 ("Having concluded that § 502(a) does not completely preempt Calad's and
Davila's THCLA claims, we vacate and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent
with this decision."). See generally Trueman, supra note 2, at 442-46 (analyzing the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Roark relating to Calad and Davila's claims as being consistent with the
Supreme Court ruling in Pegram).
199. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2004).
200. Id.
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plan benefits and coverage decisions under the health plan sponsor
agreement. 20 1 Calad underwent a hysterectomy with extensive related
20 2
Following surgery, the
surgery, performed by a Cigna surgeon.
excess of the one day
in
stay
post-operation
surgeon recommended a
20 3
nurse overrode
discharge
Cigna
A
permitted by Cigna's benefit plan.
this decision based on a failure to meet the plan's criteria for a
continued hospital stay. 204 Based on this recommendation, Cigna
denied coverage for the extended hospital stay, resulting in Calad's
5
discharge from the hospital.20 Following her discharge, Calad suffered
to the
from post-surgical complications that forced her to return
20 6
Calad
emergency room several days after leaving the hospital.
and
financial
suffered
but
injuries
her
from
eventually recovered
a
were
alleged
she
that
physical harm caused by the complications
2 07
stay.
hospital
direct result of the shortened
Juan Davila was a participant in an ERISA-regulated health plan
administered by Aetna.2 0 8 Davila is a post-polio patient who suffers
20 9 Davila's treating physician prescribed
from diabetes and arthritis.
Vioxx to treat his arthritis due to its lower rate of gastrointestinal
Aetna denied coverage of this medication and stated it
toxicity.
would only cover his Vioxx prescription if Davila first used Naprosyn, a
less expensive pain medication, and experienced a detrimental
reaction.2 11 After taking Naprosyn based on the HMO's approval,
Davila experienced severe intestinal bleeding, required emergency room
and was no longer able to take oral pain medication as a
treatment,
2 12
result.
B. State Court Claims andDistrict Court Rulings
Both Davila and Calad filed claims in state court against their HMOs
under THCLA section 88.002(a) for negligently breaching the duty of
201. Id.
202. Brief of the Amicus Curiae National Conference of State Legislatures at 1, Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83).
203. Id.
204. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Conference of State Legislatures at 1, Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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ordinary care when making their health care treatment decisions and
proximately causing their injuries. 2 13 Calad alleged that her HMO,
Cigna, negligently caused her injuries by denying her the extended postoperative hospital stay recommended by her treating surgeon. 2 14 Calad
unsuccessfully argued that Cigna was not acting as a fiduciary when it
denied her medical treatment and therefore her claim was outside the
scope of section 502(a) preemption. 2 15 Cigna removed the case to
federal district court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), arguing the claim
was preempted by ERISA section 502(a).2 1 6 If successful, Cigna would
avoid liability for compensatory and punitive damages, limiting Calad
17
and Davila's recovery to the cost of treatment denied.2
Davila filed a similar claim against Aetna, alleging that Aetna refused
to provide him with medication that his treating physician had
prescribed.2 18 Davila alleged in his claim that Aetna: (1) failed to use
ordinary care in making medical decisions; (2) acted negligently in
making its medical necessity decisions; and (3) its systems made
substandard care more likely. 2 19 Aetna successfully removed the case
to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), arguing that section
502(a) of ERISA completely preempted the claim under THCLA
section 88.002(a).2 20
The district courts refused to remand both Calad and Davila's claims
to state court, agreeing with Cigna and Aetna's arguments for complete
preemption of THCLA claims for negligent denial of treatment. 22 1 The
district court dismissed Calad's claim with prejudice since her
complaint only raised a THCLA claim and did not raise an ERISA
213. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining proximate cause as "the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's
responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct").
214. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002).
215. Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a fiduciary as "[a]
person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of
their relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, must, confidence, and
candor").
216. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) ("[A]ny civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant."); 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000) ("[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of
this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title.").
217. See supra Part II.C. 1 (contrasting the availability of compensatory and punitive damages
recovery under THCLA and the limitation of recovery to cost of treatment denied under ERISA).
218. Roark, 307 F.3d at 303.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 302-03.
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claim. 222 The district court dismissed Davila's claim with prejudice
court that he would not amend his complaint to
after he informed the 223
claim.
ERISA
an
raise
C. The Fifth CircuitDecision

Calad and Davila appealed to the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the
district court erred in finding that section 502(a) of ERISA preempted
their claims for negligent denial of treatment under THCLA section
88.002(a). 224 The Fifth Circuit consolidated four claims involving
ERISA preemption that included Calad and Davila's appeals. 225 Three
of the four cases concerned section 502(a) complete preemption and one
226
of the cases concerned section 514 conflict preemption of claims.
claims, holding
The court vacated and remanded Calad and Davila's
227
claims.
their
preempt
not
did
that section 502(a)
The court primarily relied on the holding from Pegram, identifying
Calad and Davila's claims as not based on mixed decisions of eligibility
and treatment because of the exclusively administrative role of the
HMO's agent, placing the denials outside the scope of ERISA
preemption. 22 8 Second, the court noted that the claims asserted by
Calad and Davila were based in tort, while the remedies from ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B) were limited to contract claims. 22 9 Third, the court
limited complete preemption to situations where the state mimicked the
230
Since THCLA created a
causes of action from section 502(a).
remedy allowing for compensatory and punitive damages and was not
limited to benefits collection, section 502(a) did not preempt the claims

222. Id. at 302.
223.

Id. at 303.

224. Id. at 302.
225. Id. The Supreme Court only granted certiorari for two of the four cases consolidated by
the Fifth Circuit in the Davila case. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2448, 2492 (2004).
Therefore, this Note only concerns itself with discussion concerning Calad and Davila's claims,
which were eventually heard by the Supreme Court.
226. Roark, 307 F.3d at 302-03.
227. Id. at 311. See generally Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Employee Benefits Law: Betrayed
Without a Remedy-Again, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 805, 810-15 (2004) (reviewing the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Roark and concluding that ERISA plan participants were left without an
avenue for adequate recovery).
228. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000)); see supra Part
lI.B.3 (discussing the Pegram holding in detail and the terms of the Supreme Court's ruling).
229. Roark, 307 F.3d at 309. See generally Zanglein, supra note 227, at 814-15 (analyzing
the holding of the Roark court in detail).
230. Roark, 307 F.3d at 310-11 ("We glean from Rush Prudentialthat Pilot Life's rule is a
narrow one: States may not duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA § 502(a).").
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31

2
brought by Calad and Davila.
Dissatisfied with the results of the Roark decision by the Fifth Circuit
concerning their consolidated cases, Aetna and Cigna petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari.2 3 2 On November 3, 2003,
23 3
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.

D. The UnitedStates Supreme Court Decision
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding that ERISA section 502(a)
completely preempted THCLA claims filed by Calad and Davila,
making them removable from state to federal court.2 3 4 This section will
examine the opinion and its interpretation of the scope of complete
preemption under section 502(a) of ERISA.2 35 Next, this section will
examine the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsberg, with particular
23
emphasis on her call for congressional intervention. g
1. The Unanimous Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court. 2 3 7 The
Court began its discussion by illustrating the basis for removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) and the exception made to the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule made for complete preemption cases. 2 38 The Court
stated that complete preemption statutes such as ERISA create an
exclusive remedial formula for certain types of claims within the federal
court system. 2 39 The Court explained that the removal of THCLA
claims from state to federal court would therefore be appropriate if the
240
scope of section 502(a) included the claims.
In order to come to this conclusion, the Court discussed the

231. Id. at311.
232. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 22428332 (U.S. Jun. 20,
2003) (No. 02-1826); Cigna v. Calad, petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 22428549 (U.S. Jul. 14,
2003) (No. 03-83).
233. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2488 (2004).
234. Id. at 2493.
235. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the unanimous opinion of the Court as delivered by
Justice Thomas).
236. See infra Part III.D.2 (analyzing the concurrence of Justice Ginsburg).
237. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
238. Id. at 2494-95 ("There is an exception, however, to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
'[W]hen a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete
preemption,' the state claim can be removed." (quoting Beneficial Nat'l. Bank v. Anderson, 539
U.S. 1, 8 (2003))).
239. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
240. Id. at 2494-95.
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legislative intent behind ERISA's passage in 1974.241 The Court
referred to 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), which states that ERISA was enacted to
protect the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and to
provide for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
federal courts.! 4 2 The Court examined the comprehensive legislative
scheme of ERISA as including an integrated system of procedures for
enforcement. 243 The Court stated that the comprehensiveness of the
scheme was an essential feature in order to provide uniform regulation
of employee benefit plans in furtherance of ERISA's legislative
goals.24 4 Allowing state claims for ERISA plan participants and
beneficiaries in addition to those permitted by the federal scheme of
enforcement would undermine the entire policy intent behind ERISA's
passage.245 Therefore, the Court concluded that a state law cause of
action that duplicates the remedial scheme in ERISA was preempted by
ERISA.2 46
The Supreme Court then examined the complaints, THCLA, and
documents concerning the health plans' administration. 24 7 The Court,
by looking to the wording of the respondents' benefit plans, found that
the complaints only contained allegations concerning denials of
coverage for treatments as part of their ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans. 24 8 Justice Thomas noted in particular that the respondents
could have sought injunctive relief or paid for the treatment themselves
and sought reimbursement through an ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)
claim.24 9 Although the respondents argued that the duty of ordinary
care required by THCLA was an independent legal duty, the Court read
section 88.002(d) as justifying the conclusion that the duty of care
imposed by the statute did not arise independently of ERISA. 2 50 The
241. Id. at 2495.
242. 29 U.S.C. §1001(b) (2000); Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495. "The purpose of ERISA is to
provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans ...intended to ensure that
employee benefit plan regulation would be 'exclusively a federal concern."' Id. (quoting Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
243. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
147 (1985)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. ("[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA
remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.").
247. Id.at 2496.
248. Id.
249. Id.at 2497.
250. Id. at 2497-98. "More significantly, THCLA clearly states that '[t]he standards in
Subsections (a) and (b) create no obligation on the part of the health insurance carrier ...or other
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Court found that a managed care entity could not be subject to liability
under THCLA2 51
if it denied coverage for any treatment that it was not
administering.
The Supreme Court then examined the Fifth Circuit's three-part

rationale concluding that the respondents' claims were outside the scope
of ERISA section 502(a).252 The Court found that each of the three
reasons for reversal of the district court's253decision that the claims were
preempted under ERISA were erroneous.
The first reason proffered by the circuit court stated that the

respondents' tort claim was distinguishable from ERISA claims, which
it characterized as contractual in nature. 254 The Court considered the
Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life cases, where all of the plaintiffs

brought tort-like claims that were found to be preempted by ERISA.255
Based on the clear precedent in these prior cases, the Court held that the
circuit court's characterization of the claims as torts and not c6ntract
disputes did not preclude preemption under section 502(a).256
The Supreme Court then considered the second reason for the Fifth
Circuit's holding. 257 The Court found the lower court's conclusion that
the wording of the employee benefit plans was immaterial to the

respondents' cause of action was erroneous. 2 5 8 The Court held that the
discussion of the benefit plans was relevant to the link between THCLA
2 59
claims and ERISA preemption.

To reverse the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court then
examined the primary rationale proffered by the Fifth Circuit, which
was based upon Rush Prudential.260 The appellate court interpreted the
managed care entity to provide ... treatment which is not covered by the health care plan of the
entity."' Id. (quoting THCLA section 88.002(d)).
251. Id.at2498.
252. ld.at 2498-99. See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text (describing the threepart rationale of the circuit court).
253. Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2498-99.
254. Id.at 2498 (citing Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2002)).
255. Id. at 2499. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S 41, 43 (1987) (holding that a
suit requesting damages for tortious breach of contract was held to be within the preemptive
scope of ERISA); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (deciding that a suit
requesting damage for mental anguish caused by breach of contract for an ERISA-qualified
employee benefit plan was preempted by ERISA section 502(a)); supra Part II.B (discussing the
Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life cases in detail and the precedent set by these decisions).
256. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2499.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the Supreme Court's examination of the wording of
the benefit plans held by the respondents as relevant to the determination of ERISA preemption.)
260. Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2499.
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Supreme Court in Rush Prudential as holding that a state cause of
action was preempted by ERISA section 502(a) only when it precisely
duplicated an ERISA remedy. 2 6 1 The Supreme Court clarified this
interpretation, stating that the preemptive power of ERISA section
502(a) was not limited to those claims that mimic the remedies provided

by ERISA. 2 62 The Court justified this interpretation of the language of
Rush Prudential by referring to the legislative intent behind ERISA,
a uniform remedial
stating that the congressional intent to create
2 63

mechanism required broad preemptive power.
The Supreme Court then turned to the respondents' argument that
THCLA avoids preemption by meeting the "savings clause" of ERISA

section 514(b)(2)(A). 2o4 The respondents argued that THCLA was a
part of the state's general regulation of insurance and therefore met the
"savings clause" exception to ERISA preemption. 2 65 In order to resolve

this issue, the Court considered its holding from the Pilot Life case as it
applied to the respondents' claims. 26 6 The Court noted that state law
claims in the past were determined to be exclusive of the remedial
scheme of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. 26 7 The Court cited Rush
Prudential, in which it determined that the existence of a

comprehensive remedial scheme could be demonstrative of an
overpowering federal policy that would require preemption of a state

law that regulates insurance generally. 26 8 The Supreme Court held that

the reasoning in Pilot Life that a claim that "relates to" an employee
benefit plan is expressly preempted under section 514(a) of ERISA
applied with full force in this case, and that the state-law claims
provided by THCLA in section 88.002(b) would be in conflict with the
purpose of ERISA were they permitted to stand.2 69 Therefore, based
261. Id. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 310 (5th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the
holding in Ingersoll-Rand as described in the Rush Prudential case as limiting ERISA section
501 (a)'s preemptive scope to state causes of action duplicating a cause of action under ERISA).
262. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2499.
263. Id at 2500 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
264. Id. See supra Part II.A. 1 (describing the "savings clause" of ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A)
as precluding regulations of insurance generally from being subject to ERISA and therefore
subject to preemption); see also supra Part II.A.1 (illustrating the "conflict preemption" of
ERISA section 514 and ERISA's limited application in most cases to laws which are not part of
the general regulatory scheme of insurance).
265. Brief for Respondents at 51-58, Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2448 (2004) (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83).
See supra Part II.A. 1 (detailing the source and interpretation of the "savings clause" exception to
ERISA and its scope).
266. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500.
267. Id.
268. Id.(citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375 (2002)).
269. Id.("Allowing respondents to proceed with their state-law suits would 'pose an obstacle

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

upon the legislative intent of ERISA as defined in Pilot Life and the
holding in Rush Prudential, the Court held that state laws such as

THCLA that regulate insurance broadly could circumvent the "savings
clause" of section 514(a)(1)(B)
because of the presence of an
27
overpowering federal policy.

Finally, the Supreme Court clarified the holding in Pegram, a case
which had been relied upon heavily by the respondents in arguing
against preemption of their claims, but which had been interpreted both
narrowly and broadly by the circuit courts. 2 7 1 The respondents and
their amici argued that Pegram stood for the proposition that all denials

of treatment based on "mixed decisions of eligibility and treatment"
were not fiduciary acts and therefore outside of the scope of ERISA

preemption. 2 72 The Court distinguished the holding in Pegram, stating
that Pegram was based upon the treating physician's wrongful denial of

care, while in this case the petitioners were acting in an administrative
role similar to that of a trustee for a traditional medical trust, not in the
role of direct treatment. 2 73 The Supreme Court reviewed the Pilot Life

and Metropolitan Life cases again, in which claims based on disability
determinations made by the insurers of ERISA-regulated benefit plans

were found to be preempted by section 502(a) of ERISA.2 74 Since the
petitioners in these cases were acting in the role of insurers when they
made the treatment denials, the Court used this precedent as additional
support for a narrower interpretation of the holding in Pegram.275 The
Court clarified and distinguished the holding in Pegram by clearly
to the purposes and objectives of Congress."') (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 52 (1987)).
270. Id. "[E]ven a state law that can arguably be characterized as 'regulating insurance' will
be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in
addition to, ERISA's remedial scheme." Id.
271. Id. at 2501. See infra Part II.B.3 (reviewing the broad and narrow interpretations of the
holding in Pegram by the circuit courts in the years prior to 2004 that led to the need for the
Supreme Court's clarification).
272. See Brief for Respondents at 35-38, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (Nos. 02-1845, 0383) (arguing for a broad recognition of the Court's ruling in Pegram that would exempt all mixed
decisions of eligibility and treatment from ERISA regulation); supra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the
circuit court rulings relating to a broad interpretation of Pegram). See generally Tanya Albert,
Both Sides Ready for HMO Liability Fight, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/02/16/gvsbO2l6.htm ("The two camps spelled out their
opinions in seven friend-of-the-court briefs.").
273. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2501.
274. Id. at 2501 n.6. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987) (reversing
the lower court's determination that the plaintiff's claims were not preempted by ERISA); see
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 61 (1987) (holding that the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule did not apply to statutes such as ERISA under the complete preemption doctrine).
275. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2501 n.6.
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stating that "[t]he fact that a benefits determination is infused with
medical judgments does not alter [the preemption of this claim under
ERISA]."26

Next, the Supreme Court examined the definition of a fiduciary
within the provisions of ERISA itself.277 The Court also considered
section 503 of ERISA, which requires plans to provide an opportunity
for all participants to appeal a denial of treatment to a named
fiduciary. 278 Using this as evidence, the Supreme Court determined that
the ultimate decision-maker in a plan regarding benefits determinations
must be a fiduciary, therefore implying determinations concerning
fiduciaries
medical judgments for denials of care were
279 actions by plan
and within the scope of ERISA regulation.
The Court concluded its opinion by narrowly interpreting Pegram
while leaving the door open for a certain class of claims that can
potentially circumvent ERISA preemption. 280

The Supreme Court

clarified that cases where there was a "mixed eligibility and treatment
decision" only existed when medical necessity decisions made by the
treating physician in the role of benefits administrator. 28 1 The Court
left open the possibility of state claims in cases where the agent of an
HMO is acting in the dual role of treating physician or a treating
physician's employer as well as benefits administrator. 28 2 Nevertheless,
276. Id. at 2501.
277. Id. at 2501-02. Under ERISA,
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (2000).
278. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at2502.
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit plan shall-(l)
provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for
benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for denial,
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and (2) afford a
reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for
a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the
claim.
29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
279. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502. "Classifying any entity with discretionary authority over
benefits determinations as anything but a plan fiduciary would thus conflict with ERISA's
statutory and regulatory scheme." Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. (quoting Pegram v. Hendrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2155 (2000)).
282. Id. ("Put another way, the reasoning of Pegram 'only make[s] sense where the
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in this case, the Court distinguished Pegram from Davila because the
petitioners in Davila were neither the treating physicians nor were they
283
the employers of the treating physicians.
Based on the fiduciary role of the petitioners and the Court's rulings
that the denials of treatment were within the preemptive scope of
ERISA, the Court reversed and remanded the claims for further
proceedings.284 This effectively invalidated THCLA section 88.002(a)
and dismissed the claims of Calad and Davila, since they refused to

bring claims under ERISA's remedial scheme. 285 Calad and Davila
chose not to bring ERISA claims because of the limitation of recovery

to the cost of the benefit denied, which would have been negligible
relative to the amount they were seeking through punitive and

compensatory
damages, especially in light of the prohibitive cost of
286
litigation.

2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote separately in a
concurring opinion in order to emphasize her own 'views on the
responsibilit of Congress to rectify the "regulatory vacuum" of ERISA
preemption. 2 87 Justice Ginsburg agreed with the decision of the Court,
stating that the decision was consistent with precedent concerning
ERISA preemption. 2 88 Nevertheless, she specifically noted both her

own dissenting opinion from prior Supreme Court case law and her
continued insistence that Congress take action to resolve the unjust

underlying negligence also plausibly constitutes medical maltreatment by a party who can be
deemed to be a treating physician or such a physician's employer."') (quoting Cicio v. Does, 321
F.3d 83, 109 (2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.at 2502-03 n.7 ("Respondents have thus chosen not to pursue any ERISA claim,
including any claim arising under ERISA § 502(a)(3).").
286. See supra Part 1I.B.1-2 (detailing the unavailability of extracontractual damages
recovery in an ERISA claim); Hoffman & Hiepler, supra note 50, at A19 ("When [ERISA
preemption is] applied to managed care health plans, the clause creates an incentive to deny care
because it removes ('preempts') state law protections for patients, while federal law offers them
virtually no effective remedy."). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (providing the equitable
forms of relief available under the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism).
287. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See generally William H. Sage,
Health Law 2000: The Legal System and the Changing Health Care Market, HEALTH AFF., Fall

1996, at 12 (defining the "ERISA vacuum" created by the lack of remedies set forth in ERISA's
civil remedy scheme combined with the preemption of most state-law attempts at providing a
more adequate form of relief).
288. Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("That decision is consistent with
our governing case law on ERISA's preemptive scope.").
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remedial scheme of ERISA.2 8 9
Ginsburg's concurrence noted that the Court's interpretation of

ERISA's broad-ranging preemptive power along with the narrow
remedial mechanism created by ERISA in section 502(a)(3) created a
''regulatory vacuum" where achieving make-whole relief is
impossible.2 9 °

She stated that the equitable relief created by ERISA

precludes personal liability291for personal injuries, excluding recovery of
extracontractual damages.

The concurring opinion referred to the lower court case and opinions
in prior years that had called for a narrowing of ERISA's preemptive
292
scope, including the Cicio and DeFelice cases.

Justice Ginsburg

called for a reconsideration of the availability of consequential damages
based on the lack of make-whole relief for
under section 502(a)(3)
29
treatment denials.

Justice Ginsburg noted that the United States, in its amicus brief,
recognized a potential opportunity for consequential damages
recovery. 294 The government suggested that the Court had previously
precluded the recovery of monetary damages against a non-fiduciary in
295 The amicus brief
the Court's interpretation of section 502(a)(3).
suggested that the respondents could have amended their complaints to
contain a request for make-whole relief against the agents of the HMO
acting as fiduciaries under ERISA. 29 6 Thus, Justice Ginsburg stated
that the respondents could contend that Aetna and Cigna, as fiduciaries,
were not subject to the rule precluding make-whole recovery that had

289. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("But, with greater enthusiasm ... I also join 'the rising
judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly
tangled ERISA regime."' (quoting DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir.
2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
290. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
291. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See generally Cicio v. Vytra
Healthcare, 312 F.3d 83, 83 (2d Cir. 2003); DeFelice,346 F.3d at 442.
292. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
293. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "[The] 'gaping wound' caused by the breadth of
preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, will not be healed
until the Court 'start[s] over' or Congress 'wipefs] the slate clean."' Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting DeFelice, 346 F.3d at 467).
294. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 27-28 n.13,
Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845) (suggesting ERISA "allows at least some forms of
'make-whole' relief against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief
in equity at the time of the divided bench").
295. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae
United States at 27-28 n.13, Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845)).
296. Id.(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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been applied to non-fiduciaries under ERISA.2 97
Justice Ginsburg concluded her concurrence by making a last appeal
to Congress, looking for a revision of ERISA's language in order to
allow for a more adequate recovery scheme to be developed.2 98
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court in Aetna Health v. Davila correctly held that
ERISA preempted the state-based claim for negligent denial of
treatment brought by the respondents. 29 9
The Court properly
determined that the federal regulatory mechanism created by ERISA
section 502(a)(3) completely preempted and effectively superceded the
civil recovery provisions of THCLA section 88.002(a). 30 0 This Part
begins by arguing that the Court correctly interpreted ERISA's broad
preemptive scope under prior case precedent, particularly by correctly
distinguishing the holding in Pegram.30 1 Next, this Part contends that
the legislative intent behind ERISA and the reading of THCLA's plain
language support the conclusion of the Court.30
Finally, this Part
concludes by arguing that Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion
appropriately places the burden ujpon Congress to reform ERISA in
order to create more just outcomes.
A. The Court CorrectlyFound that Caladand Davila'sState-Based
Claims Were Preemptedby ERISA
The Supreme Court correctly distinguished the claims of Davila and
Calad from the "mixed decisions of eligibility and treatment" in
Pegram.30 4 Both the unanimous and concurring opinions recognized
the important distinction between a decision made by a treating
297. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
298. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "'Congress ... intended ERISA to replicate the core
principles of trust remedy law, including the make-whole standard of relief.' I anticipate that
Congress, or this Court, will one day so confirm." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting John
Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell,
Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1319 (2003)).
299. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 (explaining the holding of the case).
300. See id. (discussing preemption of THCLA section 88.002(a) claims in state court by
ERISA section 502(a)).
301. See infra Part JV.A (analyzing the consistency of the Davila holding with prior case law,
including Pegram).
302. See infra Part IV.B (reviewing the legislative intent behind ERISA and the language of
THCLA for consistency with the Court's holding).
303. See infra Part IV.C (arguing in support of Justice Ginsburg's call for congressional
reform of ERISA).
304. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 (distinguishing the claim in Pegram from that raised in the
Davilacase).
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physician-employee such as in the Pegram case and a decision made

3°5 The Court
purely in an administrative capacity as in the Davila case.
in Pegram was clear in framing its holding and limiting the rule
concerning "mixed decisions of eligibility and treatment" to situations
where the decisionmaker was a treating physician as well as an
30 6 Since the administrator in
administrative employee of the HMO.

Davila who made the treatment denial was acting solely in an
the Court30to7
administrative role, this decision was appropriately held by
preemption.
ERISA
to
exception
Pegram
the
be outside the scope of
Although recent attempts by the circuit courts to read Pegram
in its
expansively were considered by the Court, the Court was correct
opinion.30 8
Pegram
the
in
language
specific
of
narrower interpretation
Relying on a more precise reading of Pegram, the Court affirmed the
concerning administrative decisions
preemptive scope of ERISA
30 9
regarding benefits eligibility.
B. The Court Correctly Overruledthe Applicability of the "Right to
Sue" Section of THCLA and Other Similar State Statutes
The legislative intent behind ERISA was to create a uniform system
3 10 Essential to this objective is
of regulation of retirement benefit plans.

a civil enforcement mechanism that is the exclusive means of enforcing

3 1 1 The Court appropriately relied on this
actions regulated by ERISA.

88.002(a) was
basic principle in determining that THCLA section
3 12
inapplicable to ERISA-regulated health plans.

The unanimous

as
305. See id. (recognizing the difference in treatment decisions made by a treating physician
contrasted to a decision made by an administrative employee of the HMO); id at 2503 (Ginsburg,
were
J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's determination that the facts in Pegram
distinguishable from those in Davila).
306. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (describing the Supreme Court's
of
holding as limited in scope to situations involving a treating physician placed in the dual role
of the
administrative benefit determination); supra Part II.B.3 (describing in detail the holding
Supreme Court in Pegram).
307. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 ("[P]etitioners are neither respondents' treating physicians nor
are
the employers of the respondents' treating physicians. Petitioners' coverage decisions, then
pure eligibility decisions, and Pegram is not implicated.").
court
308. See id. at 2500-02 (considering the arguments made regarding the prior circuit
reading
expansive
the
(describing
II.B.4
Part
supra
broadly);
more
Pegram
interpreting
holdings
of Pegramby the circuit courts leading up to the Davila decision).
309. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 (detailing the rationale behind holding that ERISA
preemption under section 501(a) applied to the case).
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (detailing the intentions of Congress behind ERISA's
enactment).
311. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the necessity of an exclusive civil enforcement
mechanism in order to promote the primary intent of ERISA).
312. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2502 (holding that the civil enforcement remedy provided in
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opinion in Davila accurately concluded that the statute was specifically
designed to provide a state-based remedy that directly related to the
administration of benefits by reviewing the structure of THCLA.3 13
Relying on the holding in Pilot Life, the Court correctly determined that

ERISA therefore superseded the civil remedy in THCLA section
88.002(a).3 14
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could have affirmed the holding of

the circuit court and permitted the state claims under THCLA section
88.002(a) to progress. 3 15 Had the Court affirmed the circuit court's
holding, this would have permitted claims based on state-based "right to
sue" statutes to proceed relating to wrongful denials of treatment by
ERISA-regulated health benefit plan providers.3 1 6 Permitting state-

based treatment denial claims to circumvent ERISA would have
permitted a patchwork of non-uniform state regulations to impose
liability upon HMOs resulting in the precise circumstance ERISA was
enacted to prevent.30

Nevertheless, it is important to note, as did the Court, that options
exist for beneficiaries under ERISA's remedial scheme that could
reduce the need for extracontractual damages. 318 The HMO could be
required to provide payment for the claim if the beneficiary sought an
injunction under ERISA section 502(a) after the initial denial of
treatment. 3 19 Similarly, the denial of payment for treatment does not
preclude treatment on the part of the beneficiary. 320 Davila and Calad
THCLA section 88.002(a) was preempted by ERISA section502).
313. See id. at 2496-97 (considering the scope of THCLA section 88.002(a) as being
directly
related to the civil enforcement mechanism of ERISA section 502(a)).
314. See id. at 2500 (citing the Court's holding in Pilot Life as a basis for superseding
THCLA
section 88.002(a) claim); supra Part II.B.2 (detailing the holding in Pilot Life).
315. See Davila 124 S. Ct. at 2494 (describing the holding of the appellate court).
316. See supra Part II.C (reviewing the state legislative attempts enacting "right
to sue"
statutes that permit state-court remedies for negligent denials of treatment by HMOs);
see
generally NCSL Report, supra note 6 (highlighting the ten states that have had their "right
to sue"
statutes affected by the Davila decision).
317. See supra Part lI.B.1 (analyzing the intent behind ERISA's enactment
and the
congressional intent behind its remedial scheme and preemptive power).
318. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (recognizing the availability of alternate
means of
remedial action available to the respondents).
319. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (listing the various relief mechanisms available
under the
civil enforcement scheme of ERISA as including "recover[y of] benefits due to him
under the
terms of his plan ... enforc[ing] his rights under the terms of the plan, or ... clarify[ing]
his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan"); supra Part II.A (detailing the civil
remedies
available under ERISA section 502(a)).
320. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (describing the variety of options available
to the
respondents within section 502(a) of ERISA); News Release, American Benefits
Council,
Supreme Court Ruling on Health Care Claims Raises Important Policy Issues: American
Benefits
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had the opportunity to pay for their own treatment and then file a suit
32 1 The potential availability of
for recovery of cost of treatment.

within ERISA makes this
recovery for attorney costs explicitly provided
322
parties.
option all the more viable to injured

C. Justice Ginsburg's ConcurrenceAppropriatelyPlaces the Burden
on Congress to Reform ERISA to Create "Make- Whole" Relief

Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion appropriately emphasizes the
need for a revision of ERISA's remedial scheme in order to meet the

needs of modem society. 3 23 The precedent in Pegram and Pilot Life
and the legislative intent of ERISA's passage clearly demonstrate the
Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemptive scope as applying to

claims for wrongful denials of treatment made by an administrative

agent of the benefit provider. 324 Nevertheless, the underlying intent of

ERISA must be revised to provide for uniform regulation of benefits
provisions in light of the rapidly evolving role of healthcare insurance in
the United States. 325 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion
in Districtof Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, a fresh

look at the ERISA regulatory scheme is necessary in light of the
changing environment and growing numbers of claims preempted by
ERISA. '
Rulings, June 21, 2004, available at
Council Responds to Critics of Today's Davila, Calad
4 32
- .cfm (quoting James A. Klein,
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/newsroom/pr
president of the American Benefits Council commenting on the Davila ruling, stating, "[t]he
refusal of the plaintiffs or their doctors to follow the procedures to either have the plan decision
promptly reviewed, or to go forward with their preferred medical course of action-taking a
different drug (Davila) and staying an extra night in the hospital (Calad)--even if their eligibility
for financial reimbursement was in doubt-makes the plaintiffs' lawsuits far less justifiable").
321. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (making available the cost of the treatment in the case of a
wrongful denial by the benefits provider).
322. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) (providing for the potential recovery of attorney costs at the
discretion of the court under equitable relief theory for an ERISA claim).
323. See Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (detailing the growing judicial
insistence on congressional reform of the ERISA remedial scheme in light of the modem
healthcare system and lack of "make-whole" relief).
324. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the appropriateness of the Court's reliance on the
precedent in Pegramand Pilot Life in determining the result of the Davila case).
325. See Tony Mauro, Health Industry Wins Big at Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, June 22,
2004, available at http://www.law.com ("'Consumers are foreclosed from any meaningful
recovery,' said Sarah Lock, senior attorney at the AARP. 'ERISA remedies are just not
sufficient."'). Under ERISA insured patients can recover the cost of the benefit that was denied
and can get injunctive relief, but not lost wages or pain-and-suffering damages that might be
available under state tort law. Id.
326. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Given the open-ended implications of today's holding and the burgeoning volume
of litigation involving ERISA preemption claims, I think it is time to take a fresh look at the
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Justice Ginsburg appropriately wrote that it is squarely the
responsibility of Congress to reform ERISA's remedial scheme in order
to meet with the changing needs of society today.3 27 The concurring

opinion correctly stated that the judiciary is bound by the terms of the
statute and is not granted discretion to change the terms of ERISA as

enacted, no matter what the practical need.3 28 Further narrowing of the
preemptive scope of ERISA would not only be a violation of the
precedent set forth in prior case law, it would have disastrous effects on

the ability of health insurance plans to operate effectively. 329 Therefore,
Justice Ginsburg correctly stated that the most appropriate means of
reform is through legislative, rather than judicial, change.33°
V. IMPACT

The ruling in Davila has a potentially wide-ranging impact on current
and future legislation, as well as judicial interpretation of ERISA at the
state and federal levels. 33 1 This Part begins by describing the impact of

Davila, clarifying the scope of preemption of state claims for wrongful

denial of treatment in previously decided and newly heard cases in the
circuit courts. 33 2 Next, this Part illustrates the impact of Davila on

intended scope of the pre-emption provision that Congress enacted.").
327. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (calling for congressional
reform in light of the lack of appropriate "make-whole" relief in ERISA's regulatory scheme).
See generally Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court and Health Law: The Year
in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHics 528, 529 (Fall 2004).
In reality, ERISA's remedial provisions are so penurious that Aetna's holding of
complete preemption produces a legal regime that vastly under-compensates plan
members who suffer a wrongful denial of care ...[T]his means that a patient who
suffers grievous harm as a direct result of an improper denial of treatment may recover
ex post only the value of that treatment, and nothing for the injuries that were a
foreseeable consequence of such denial.
Id.
328. See Davila, 124 S.Ct. at 2503-04 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting the inability of the
judiciary to enact legislative reform).
329. See supra Part W.A-B (analyzing the effects of an alternative decision made by the
Court in Davila and reviewing the clear precedent of prior case law).
330. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (joining the "the rising judicial
chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled
ERISA regime" (citing DeFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir.
2003))).
331. See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Aetna Health v. Davila: Implications
for Public Health Policy, 119 PUB. HEALTH REP. 510, 510-12 (2004) (reviewing the implications
of the Davila ruling on future claims for wrongful denial of treatment and the impact on managed
care liability laws in various states).
332. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the Davila ruling virtually eliminates all state claims for
recovery under wrongful denial of treatment theories for ERISA-regulated health plans).
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liability. 33 3
THCLA and other state legislative mechanisms for HMO
pressures placed on Congress
Finally, this Part analyzes the additional
33 4
ERISA.
to
reform
legislative
to enact
A. JudicialResponse to Davila in the FederalCourts
After the Court published its opinion in Davila, a series of cases were
heard in lower courts, both on remand and independent of the Supreme
Court's involvement. 33 5 The response of the federal judiciary in these
relating to claims for
cases is illustrative of the potential role of Davila
336
courts.
federal
in
denial
wrongful treatment

1. Revision of Rulings Inconsistent with Davila in the Circuit Courts
Following its ruling in Davila, the Supreme Court remanded several
cases to the appellate courts for reconsideration in light of Davila

3 37
The rationale behind remanding
concerning ERISA preemption.
of the narrow exception to
cases was to correct prior misapplications
3 38
Pegram.
by
permitted
ERISA preemption
In Cicio v. Does, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the
Second Circuit for review consistent with the Court's decision in Davila
on June 28, 2004. 33 9 The Second Circuit noted that the Davila opinion

undermined the legal foundation of its ruling in 2003.340 Based on the
clarification of the rule in Pegram, and noting that in this case the

defendants were not in the dual role of administrator and treating
physician, the court vacated its prior decision and affirmed the dismissal

333. See infra Part V.B (reviewing the impact of Davila on THCLA and each of the state
statutes affected by the decision).
334. See infra Part V.C (describing the pressure being placed upon Congress to reform the
civil remedial mechanism of ERISA).
335. See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding to the circuit court in
light of the Davila holding); Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2004) (relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Davila in deciding a case concerning an alleged
wrongful treatment denial).
336. See generally 1 EMP.COORDINATOR BENEFITS § 5:170 (2004) (detailing the impact of
the Davila decision and illustrating several cases decided immediately following Davila that
apply the narrow interpretation of Pegram'sERISA preemption exception).
337. See, e.g., Cicio, 385 F.3d at 156 (noting that the Supreme Court had remanded the
decision of the appellate court in 2003 for reconsideration in light of the Davila holding).
338. See generally id. (reversing the prior decision of the court in 2003 and holding that
ERISA preemption precluded state claims against the non-treating physician employees of the
HMO).
339. Id. at 157-58.
340. Id. at 158 ("Aetna Health Inc. fatally undermines our reasoning in the panel decision in
Cicio.").
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of the complaint based on ERISA preemption. 3 4 1

Similarly, the Supreme Court remanded Land v. Vytra Healthcareto
the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of Davila.342 The
Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that the Pegram exception based on

a "mixed determination of eligibility and treatment" was clarified in

Davila to be limited to situations where the treating physician is the

object of the claim. 343 Relying on this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
vacated its previous decision and affirmed the lower court decision

holding

that

negligence.

344

ERISA

precluded

Land's

state-based

claim

for

2. Cases Heard Concerning Preemption Following Davila

In the months immediately following Davila, the clarification of the
Court's prior ruling in Pegram was relied upon to decide several cases
concerning treatment denials. 345 The clear limitation of the "mixed
decision of eligibility and treatment" exception to ERISA preemption
by the Court in Davila led to the rejection of a series of state-based
claims for wrongful denials of treatment by HMO administrators.346
The Fifth Circuit decided Mayeaux v. Louisiana Health Service and
Indemnity Co. on July 1, 2004, immediately following the Davila
ruling. 34 7 Relying substantially on the Davila holding, the court found

that ERISA preempts state-law claims against a health plan
administrator by a plan participant and her physician based on denial of
an experimental treatment. 348 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court decision limited the mixed eligibility and treatment exception to
ERISA to wrongful determinations made by employee physicians of
341. Id.
342. Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 381 F.3d 1274 (1lth Cir. 2004).
343. Id. at 1276 ("The Court also cast doubt on our analysis of and reliance on Pegram,
finding that Pegram is only implicated in circumstances in which the healthcare professionals
brought to suit are either the injured party's treating physicians or the employers of the injured
party's treating physicians").
344. Id. ("In light of the Supreme Court's conclusions, we find that Land's causes of action,
brought to remedy the denial of benefits under an ERISA-regulated benefit plan, fall within the
scope of, and are completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and are thus removable to
federal court.").
345. See generally 1 EMP. COORDINATOR BENEFITS § 5:170 (2004) (detailing the impact of
the Davila decision and illustrating several cases decided immediately following Davila that
apply the narrow interpretation of Pegram's ERISA preemption exception).
346. See, e.g., Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co, 376 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that ERISA preempted the insured's tort claim against a group health care provider).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 431-32. See 1 EMP. COORDINATOR BENEFITS § 5:170 (2004) (describing the
holding of the fifth circuit in Mayeaux immediately following Davila).
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349
HMOs acting as both plan administrators and caregivers.
Additionally, following the precedent of Davila in holding certain
aspects of state legislation superceded by ERISA's exclusive regulatory
scheme, the Third Circuit in Barber v. Unum Life Insurance Co. ruled
that ERISA preempted and invalidated a Pennsylvania "bad faith"
statute. 350 The Pennsylvania "bad faith" law permitted insurance plan
participants and beneficiaries to file a suit for punitive damages in state
the insured.3 5 1
court based upon an action in bad faith by an insurer to
The plaintiff requested punitive damages based on a termination 3 of
in bad faith. 52
disability benefits by the defendant that was allegedly
The defendant insurer claimed that the state-law based claim conflicted
with the exclusive remedial scheme of ERISA by supplementing the
available remedies with punitive damages. 353 The court, relying on
Davila, noted that state laws that permit judicial relief that add to the
exclusive remedial scheme in section 502(a)354are preempted by ERISA
and dismissed the plaintiff's bad faith claim.

B. Impact on THCLA and Other State Patients' Rights Statutes
The Davila holding substantially impacted THCLA and the other
35 5 Based upon the
state "right to sue" statutes passed prior to 2004.
349. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 431-32. See 1 EMP. COORDINATOR BENEFITS § 5:170 (2004)
("The Fifth Circuit opinion said that the Supreme Court decision 'expressly rejects' any effort to
extend the principle that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by health maintenance
organizations are not preempted by ERISA to cover traditional indemnity insurers such as the one
in this case.").
350. Barber v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Because we
hold 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371 is conflict preempted by ERISA, or alternatively expressly preempted
under ERISA § 514(a), we will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with
instructions to dismiss Barber's bad faith claim"); see also Shannon P. Duffy, Ruling Boots
Theory Allowing Bad-Faith ERISA Litigation; Decision No Surprise on Heels of U.S. Supreme
Court's Recent Ruling in Davila, PA. L. WKLY., Sept. 13, 2004 (detailing the Third Circuit's
holding in Barberthat ERISA supercedes the Pennsylvania bad-faith "right to sue" statute based
upon the precedent in Davila).
351. In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the insurer has acted
in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of the following actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was made by the
insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (West Supp. 2004).
352. Barber, 383 F.3d at 136.
353. Id. at 136-37.
354. Id. at 140 ("[A] state statute is preempted by ERISA if it provides 'a form of ultimate
relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA' (quoting Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002))).
355. See supra Part II.B.4 (listing the various states that have passed "right to sue" statutes
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precedent set by Barber interpreting Davila, ERISA will likely

supercede and preempt subsequent cases brought in state court under a
state "right to sue" statute. 356

In fact, the ruling in Davila directly

affects twelve of the state "right to sue" statutes, leaving patients with
an ERISA claim as the exclusive avenue of recovery in most
circumstances following a wrongful denial of treatment by an
administrative agent of an HMO.3 57 This effectively limits any claim

for a wrongful denial of treatment that does not fit into the limited
Pegram exception to the recovery of cost of treatment denied and bars

any potential recovery of compensatory or punitive damages. 358 For all
practical purposes, the cost of pursuing litigation of an ERISA claim
relative to the low potential for recovery in most cases will bar potential
plaintiffs from
pursuing such claims and attorneys from pursuing such
359
litigation.

In comparison to the more narrow preemption of state attempts at
regulation of HMOs in prior federal cases such as Rush Prudential,
Davila clearly creates a presumption that state regulation of the

administrative role of HMOs concerning treatment denials is in conflict
with the exclusive regulatory scheme of ERISA and therefore
preempted. 360 This trend is evident in the cases heard concerning state
"right to sue" statutes based on wrongful treatment denials following
36 1
the Davila decision to date.
similar in effect to THCLA).
356. See supra Part IV.A (reviewing the holding in the Barber case where the court held that a
Pennsylvania state law permitting recovery of punitive damages for bad faith was superceded by
ERISA).
357. Janet L. Kaminski, ERISA Bars HMO Liability Lawsuits in State Court, July 16, 2004,
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0550.htm ("According to the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 12 states have laws relating to a patient's right to sue
his managed care company that are affected by the U. S. Supreme Court's June 2004 decision.
The 12 states are: Arizona, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia"); see supra Part H.B.4 (detailing the
individual states that have passed "right to sue" statutes similar to THCLA); see also NCSL
Report, supra note 6 (listing each of the states with "right to sue" statutes passed prior to the
Davila court ruling and noting that twelve of them are adversely affected by the Davila holding).
358. See supra Part V.A.2 (describing the holding of cases applying the Davila holding to
claims for wrongful treatment denials as being limited to ERISA-based claims for relief); supra
Part II.A. 1 (analyzing the various remedies available under § 514(a) of ERISA to private parties).
359. See, e.g., supra Part III (explaining the rationale of the plaintiffs in the Davila case for
pursuing state-based claims and their refusal to pursue ERISA-based claims based on the
disparate potential for recovery).
360. See supra Part II.B.2 (detailing the history of cases considered in the federal courts
relating to potential preemption of state statutes regulating health insurance administration).
361. See supra Part V.A.2 (recounting several cases decided based on the Davila decision in
the lower courts that have held state-law based claims for wrongful treatment denials to be
preempted by ERISA).
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C. Increase in PoliticalPressurefor CongressionalReform
Throughout the last ten years, passage of a Patients' Bill of Rights
that would reform ERISA's limited remedial mechanism for health plan
6 2 Prior to
participants has received extremely strong popular support.3
Davila, the inconsistency in judicial interpretation of the scope of
ERISA's preemptive power created a split in the reform movement
363
The
between legislative change at the state and federal level.
change
of
avenue
inability of popular support to focus on a single
364
resulted in the failure of reform at the federal legislative level.
Davila, however, effectively closes off the avenue of state legislation to
circumvent ERISA as well as the availability of reform through
litigation resulting in judicial reinterpretation of ERISA's preemptive
scope. 365 Davila, although negatively affecting plan beneficiaries in
the short run by excluding the chance for more adequate recoveries in
state courts, will benefit them in the long run by 3 leading to stronger
66
pressure being placed on Congress to provide relief.
This increased pressure was evident immediately following
Davila.367 For example, California's state legislature recently proposed
a Joint Resolution urging Congress for changes to ERISA as a response
to the pressures placed upon it by constituents pushing for ERISA
reform. 36 8 Additionally, the Patients' Bill of Rights is again being
362. See KFF Report, supra note 163 (reporting the results of surveys concerning the support
for a Patients' Bill of Rights as averaging over fifty-seven percent in the past six years).
363. See Alex Calcagno, High Court Ruling Rekindles Interest in National Patients' Bill of
Rights, MASS. MED. SOC'Y ONLINE, Aug. 2004, available at http://www2.mms.org/vitalsigns/
aug04/ga2.html (describing the lack of perceived need for federal reform of ERISA due to state
legislative action in the past six years).
364. See id. ("But as states passed their own patients' rights laws and the courts ruled in favor
of harmed patients, the need for federal legislation appeared to diminish.").
365. See NCSL Report, supra note 6 (detailing the wide-ranging affect of Davila upon the
state attempts at passage of "right to sue" legislation); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct.
2488, 2502 (2004) (holding conclusively that ERISA preempts claims for wrongful denials of
treatment made by an administrative agent of a benefits plan).
366. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 2 (Ca. 2003), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_00010050/sjr 2 cfa 20040630_161250 sen floor.html (calling upon Congress to enact substantive
reform to ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism by enacting a federal Patients' Bill of Rights).
367. See, e.g., H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov
(proposing an amendment to ERISA that provides for a more substantive recovery for patients
who are subject to wrongful denials of care).
368. S.J. Res. 2 (Ca. 2003), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_00010050/sjr 2 cfa 20040630_161250 sen floor.htrnl.
This SJR calls upon: 1. Congress and the President to enact a meaningful and
enforceable Patient's Bill of Rights that includes the ability of HMO patients to hold
their HMO legally responsible for harm caused by the HMO's wrongdoing, or in the
alternative, to enact legislation that amends ERISA to allow states to provide their own
citizens with greater protections and rights than federal law.
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reconsidered for passage within Congress, containing elements that are
directly intended to provide for ERISA reform. 36 9 Proposed H.R. 4628,
the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2004, guarantees certain rights to
health insurance plan subscribers. 3 70 In part, this measure would
provide plan beneficiaries and participants the right to hold a health plan
liable if the HMO's negligent medical decision resulted in injury.3 7 1
In time, although Davila represents a short-term loss for the
proponents of ERISA reform, the elimination of state legislative and
judicial reform mechanisms will hasten the eventual victory of plan
beneficiaries in obtaining make-whole relief under ERISA.3 7 2
VI. CONCLUSION

In Aetna Health v. Davila, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
ERISA's preemptive scope as applied to administrative determinations
of health benefits.
The Court did so correctly, consistent with
established precedent, holding that the federal remedies in section
502(a)(3) of ERISA superceded THCLA section 88.002(a)'s remedial
scheme. This decision will have a wide impact on similar legislation in
a number of states, focusing the need for legislative reform on the
shoulders of Congress. The ruling has a potentially detrimental impact
on current participants in ERISA-regulated health plans by eliminating a
means of recovery for compensatory and punitive damages relating to
wrongful treatment denials by HMO administrators. Nevertheless,
future attempts at reform will be more concentrated, going forward
firmly in the realm of federal legislation. The net effect of this
increased pressure will likely result in the expedient passage of a
substantive federal Patient's Bill of Rights in the near future that will
make Davila immaterial.

Id.
369. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (providing a cause of
action for plan beneficiaries and participants who are wrongfully denied medically necessary
treatment where "such plan, plan sponsor, or issuer shall be liable to the participant or beneficiary
(or the estate of such participant or beneficiary) for economic and noneconomic damages (but not
exemplary or punitive damages) in connection with such personal injury or death").
370. See National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, HEALTH CARE REFORM, at

http://www.naw.org/Content/ContentGroups/Govermment Relations I/Advisories 1/HealthCare_
Reform.htm (describing the reintroduction of the "Patients' Bill of Rights" in the U.S. Congress
by Representative Dingell).
371. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong., at 160 (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
372. See Ruger, supra note 327, at 528 (predicting that the Davila ruling's "catalyzing force
will be vastly greater than its immediate ruling on ERISA's remedial exclusivity" by instigating
more rapid congressional reform of ERISA).

